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PAUL HORWITZ
THE RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY OF TOWN
OF GREECE v GALLOWAY
To attempt to come to terms with American religious history
apart from its geographical dimensions . . . is to risk missing
something crucially important.'
Americans are obsessed with history. That's especially true for Amer-
ican lawyers, constitutional lawyers not least among them. Of course
there are practical reasons for this obsession, including the age of the
Constitution itself. As long as some form of originalism remains im-
portant to judicial or scholarly interpretation of the Constitution,
moreover, there are strategic reasons for any constitutional lawyer
to take an interest in historical questions. But history alone is an in-
sufficient interpretive guide. Among other things, in a word, we might
consider geography.
This is certainly true for the study of American religion and re-
ligious freedom. Martin Marty, a leading figure in that field, has
noted "American religionists' . . . obsession with time over space"-
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with a temporal, rather than a spatial, understanding of American re-
ligion and religious pluralism.2 The fixation with history is equally ap-
parent in judicial decisions and legal scholarship dealing with church-
state law. Many of the key decisions of the United States Supreme
Court dealing with the Religion Clauses center on grand historical
narratives, as much mythical as real, that purport to dictate the shape
of the law in this area.' Fueled both by the cases and by their own needs
and interests, many scholars are equally focused on the lessons history
holds for Religion Clause adjudication.
While many judges and legal scholars continue to focus rather
single-mindedly on history, scholars of American religion itself have
long since shifted focus. A half-century ago, the American religious
historian Sidney Mead famously observed: "Americans have never
had time to spare. What they did have during all their formative
years was space-organic, pragmatic space-the space of action."' In
modern scholarly lingo, Mead called on religious scholarship to take
a spatial turn:
The story of America is the story of uprooted emigrant and immigrant
people, ever moving rapidly onward through space so vast that space came
to take precedence over time in the formation of their most cherished ide-
als, chief of which has been the ideal of freedom. But since the freedom of
space did not appeal to all in the same way, there was created a strange
mingling of attitudes toward the predominant conception of freedom. . . .
The "story of religion in America" must be reinterpreted in this general
context.
Since then, a substantial body of scholarship has emerged that
examines religion-including both the past and the present of Amer-
ican religion-in spatial as well as temporal terms. In the description of
a leading text, "the lens of geography is useful in considering interac-
tions between religion and diverse realms of human activity as ex-
'Martin E. Marty, Religion and Republic: The American Circumstance 198 (Beacon, 1987).
See, for example, Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Supreme
Court Review 119, 137-42.
See, for example, Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 (1878); Everson v Board of Education
of Ewing Township, 330 US 1 (1947).
See, for example, Symposium, The (Re)turn to History in Religion Clause Law and Schol-
arship, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1697 (2006).
6 Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America 5 (Harper
and Row, 1963).
' Id at 15.
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pressed in social space."' As an "integrative" discipline (like law), ge-
ography "provides an effective framework for analyzing the connec-
tion of religious belief to other spheres of thought and action at di-
verse scales."'
Legal scholarship has shown some interest in taking the spatial
turn.o It has made scattered appearances in constitutional scholar-
ship." With a few valuable exceptions, however,12 and despite the
spatial turn in American religious scholarship itself, law and religion
scholars have not yet taken full advantage of the insights that a
geographical orientation might offer their subject.
The Supreme Court's decision in Town of Greece v Galloway"
offers a good reason to change course. In Galloway, the Supreme
Court did two things. First, all of the Justices agreed that the Court
should reaffirm the decision in Marsh v Chambers," which upheld the
Nebraska legislature's practice of offering opening prayers. Second,
by a 5-4 vote, the Court applied Marsh to uphold a similar practice,
one that included openly sectarian prayers, before meetings of a
town board."
'Roger W. Stump, The Geography of Religion: Faith, Place, and Space 6 (Rowman & Lit-
tlefield, 2008). For another introduction to the geography of religion, see Chris C. Park,
Sacred Worlds: Introduction to Geography and Religion (Routledge, 1994). Key early work in the
field of geography of religion includes David E. Sopher, Geography ofReligions (Prentice-Hall,
1967), and Yi-Fu Tuan, Humanistic Geography, 66 Annals Ass'n Amer Geographers 271 (1976).
Stump, The Geography of Religion at 6 (cited in note 8).
10 See, for example, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, and Richard T. Ford, eds, The Legal
Geographies Reader (Blackwell, 2001); Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, and
Alexandre Kedar, eds, The Expanding Spaces ofLaw: A Timely Legal Geography (Stanford, 2014).
" See, for example, Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U Pa L Rev 241 (2014); Allan
Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 Minn L Rev 1168 (2011); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Dis-
placement, 86 Wash U L Rev 515 (2009); Timothy Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First
Amendment Liberties in Public Places (Cambridge, 2008).
" See especially Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause,
89 Tex L Rev 583 (2011); Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to
Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 Supreme Court Review 135; Richard C. Schragger, The Role of
the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse ofReligious Liberty, 117 Harv L Rev 1810 (2004); Mark D.
Rosen, The Radical Possibility ofLimited Community Based Interpretation ofthe Constitution, 43 Wm
& Mary L Rev 927 (2002); Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuimform Constitution: Geographical Variations
of Constitutional Requirements in the Aid of Communiy, 77 Tex L Rev 1129 (1999). Although I
disagree with many of his substantive conclusions, I am particularly indebted to Richard
Schragger's important article on localism and the Religion Clauses, which had a great influence
on Part III.B of this article.
13 134 S Ct 1811 (2014).
1463 US 783 (1983).
See Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1819 25.
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From a historical perspective, Galloway was not terribly interest-
ing. It did not add much more detail than Marsh itself provided.
From a doctrinal perspective, Galloway was interesting in two re-
spects. First, it was interesting for what it did not do. It did not do
away with any of the Establishment Clause tests governing the use
of religious speech or symbols by government. In particular, it did
not, as has long been anticipated, deliver the coup de grice to the
endorsement test for Establishment Clause violations. 6 Second, the
Court indicated that it would give history greater weight in future
Establishment Clause cases. The majority opinion, written by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, made clear that "it is not necessary to define the
precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows
that the specific practice is permitted."" This is an important devel-
opment; but, notwithstanding the excitement that greeted it," it is
not clear how far-reaching it will be.
Galloway is, however, an excellent subject for geographically in-
flected analysis. The extension of Marsh from state legislatures to in-
dividual town boards is not an immense step doctrinally, but it cer-
tainly is spatially. As Justice Elena Kagan noted in the case's principal
dissenting opinion, it involves a very different set of factual and prac-
tical considerations than does legislative prayer in the state legisla-
tures.19 And those differences, when viewed through the lens of reli-
gious geography, present a good occasion to think about a number of
perennial problems in American church-state relations and the law of
the Establishment Clause.
Part I of this article offers a summary, interspersed with analysis,
of Town of Greece v Galloway. Part II focuses on one aspect of the
majority opinion and the principal dissent: the differences-and, in
some respects, the striking similarities-in their competing visions
of American religious pluralism. Part III offers an introduction to
some basic animating concepts of religious geography, and examines
Galloway from two geographical perspectives: the role of region in
1 See Samaha, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 137 (cited in note 12).
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1819.
See Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery
of History, 2014 Cato S Ct Rev 71, 71 (2013-14) (arguing that Galloway, with its "embrace" of
history, "marks a major inflection point in the development of the law of the Establishment
Clause").
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1846-47 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (comparing and contrasting the
practices in the Nebraska state legislature and at town of Greece board meetings).
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the study of American religious pluralism and its influence on the
opinions in the case, and the failure of the majority to fully confront
the role of the local in the life and law of the Establishment Clause.
1. GALLOWAY: FivE OPINIoNS IN SEARCH OF A
CHURCH-STATE SETTLEMENT
The town of Greece, in Monroe County, New York, dates
back to 1822.20 Once an agricultural community, today it is a "res-
idential suburb" of the neighboring upstate city of Rochester, with a
2010 population of about 96,000.21
In 1999,John Auberger, the town supervisor, added opening pray-
ers to the town's monthly board meetings. The move was inspired
by Auberger's experience with prayers in the county legislature.22
Auberger wrote that he found those prayers to be "a thoughtful prac-
tice," a "kind of humbling of ourselves, before making decisions that
would ultimately impact our whole community. "23
The town had no written prayer policy. Town officials said any-
one could give the invocation, including non-Christians and atheists;
but the town did not publicize the opportunity to deliver invoca-
tions.24 Before 2007, the employees responsible for finding prayer-
givers relied variously on a chamber of commerce directory of reli-
gious organizations, a list of those who had previously given the
invocation, the list of religious groups in the local weekly newspaper,
and some additional notes.25 One employee testified that she be-
lieved she was only supposed to invite individuals and groups "lo-
cated within the Town of Greece." 2 6
A map produced during the litigation showed that most of the
groups on the lists maintained by the town of Greece were located
within its borders. It showed no Jewish synagogues, Mormon tem-
ples, or Baha'i groups within those borders. A Buddhist temple and a
20 See The Town of Greece, All About Greece, online at http://greeceny.gov/aboutgreece.
21 Id.
22 See Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1816.
23John Auberger, The Problem with Prayer in Greece, NY, 7 Faith and Justice 14, 14 (2014),
online at http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/content/docs/FnJ/FnJ-7.1.pdf. Faith and
justice is a publication of the Alliance Defending Freedom, which represented the town of
Greece in the legislative prayer litigation.
24 See Galloway v Town of Greece, 732 F Supp 2d 195, 197-200 (WDNY 2010).
21 Id at 197-200.
2
1 Id at 200.
6]
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Jehovah's Witnesses church were located in Greece, but neither
appeared on the town's lists.2
All the prayers given at town board meetings between 1999 and
2007 were Christian.2 8 Many referred to Jesus Christ, or ended the
prayer "in Jesus' name."29 For the most part, however, the substance
of the prayers was fairly standard for such civic occasions.30 The town
offered no guidance to the prayer-givers about the content of the
invocations and did not review the prayers in advance."
The plaintiffs, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, complained
to the board about its invocation practices in the fall of 2007. Fol-
lowing those complaints, the town invited representatives of the Jew-
ish and Baha'i faiths to offer the invocation, and a Wiccan priestess
asked and was permitted to do so as well.32 The plaintiffs neverthe-
less filed suit, alleging that the practice violated the Establishment
Clause by "preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by
sponsoring sectarian prayers."" They sought an order limiting in-
vocations to "inclusive and ecumenical prayers.""
The district court upheld the practice. It found insufficient evi-
dence that the town had "intentionally excluded non-Christians from
giving prayers at Town Board meetings."" The overwhelmingly
Christian nature of the invocations simply "reflect[ed] the fact that
there are comparatively few non-Christian organizations in the
Town." 6 The prayers were not required to be strictly nonsectarian,
and did not improperly engage in religious proselytization.1
The Second Circuit reversed, in an opinion by Judge Guido
Calabresi." Reading the decision in Marsh in light of subsequent
2 Id at 203.
2 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1816.
2 Galloway, 732 F Supp 2d at 203.
3 A large sample of invocations is provided in Joint Appendix, Town of Greece v Galloway,
2013 WL 3935056, *26a-143a (2013).
31 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1816.
32 Id at 1817.
3 Id.
34 Id.
" Galloway, 732 F Supp 2d at 217.
3 Id at 239.
" See id at 241-43.
3 Galloway v Town of Greece, 681 F3d 20 (2d Cir 2012).
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glosses placed on it, the court concluded that while "legislative
prayer does not necessarily run afoul of the Establishment Clause,"39
prayers that "invok[e] particular sectarian beliefs may, on the basis
of those references alone, violate the Establishment Clause.""o It ap-
plied a form of endorsement test, asking "whether the town's prac-
tice, viewed in its totality by an ordinary, reasonable observer, con-
veyed the view that the town favored or disfavored certain religious
beliefs.""1
A combination of factors doomed the practice. First, whatever its
intent, the town's practice had not "result[ed] in a perspective that is
substantially neutral amongst creeds."4 2 In particular, its failure to
look outside the town borders when searching for prayer-givers ig-
nored the fact that the town's residents might belong to faiths "that
are not represented by a place of worship within the town." Second,
given the volume of sectarian prayers at the meetings, the town was
obliged to warn the prayer-givers not to promote their own faith or
disparage others." Finally, the town had not adequately policed the
format of the invocations; they often appeared to be given directly
to the public on behalf of the board, with the expectation that the
public would participate in them, rather than given to the board.'
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy.
There was no chance that the Court would overrule Marsh v Cham-
bers." The real question in the case was whether the Court would
eliminate the endorsement test," a version of which Judge Calabresi
9 Id at 26.
40 Id at 27 (emphasis added), discussing County of Allegheny v ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 US 573 (1989).
4 Galloway, 681 F3d at 29.
4 Id at 31 (emphasis added); see also id at 32 ("We ascribe no religious animus to the town
or its leaders. . . . But when one creed dominates others-regardless of a town's intentions-
constitutional concerns come to the fore.").
4 Id at 32.
44 Id at 32-34.
4 Strikingly, the Obama administration's brief in the Supreme Court sided with the town
of Greece and did not urge reconsideration of Marsh. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Town of Greece v Galloway, 2013 WL 3990880 (2013); Nelson
Tebbe and Micah Schwartzman, The Puzzle of Town of Greece v Galloway, SCOTUSblog,
Sept. 24,2013, online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/09/symposium-the-puzzle-of-town
-of-greece-v-galloway/.
46 See, for example, Lynch v Donnelly, 465 US 668, 687 95 (1984) (O'Connor, J, concur-
ring); County ofAllegheny, 492 US at 574; Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US
6]
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had employed in his decision for the Second Circuit. Often criti-
cized," the test was widely predicted to be on its way out after the
departure of its creator, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor."8 That is not
the Roberts Court's typical approach, however,49 and it is not what it
did here, although there is at least one significant doctrinal move in
the majority opinion.
That move came in the Court's discussion of Marsh v Chambers.
Marsh has long been treated as "carving out an exception" to stan-
dard Establishment Clause tests, which could be read as prohibiting
legislative prayer.so Indeed, for those who dislike Marsh, thinking of
it in those terms-as a narrow "historical easement" over the usual
terms of Establishment Clause law-is a form of damage control,
which helps limit Marsh's application in other cases.
Justice Kennedy rejected this account. Recourse to additional
Establishment Clause doctrine was "unnecessary" in Marsh, he
wrote, because "history supported the conclusion that legislative
invocations are compatible with the Establishment Clause." 2 He
continued:
290, 308 (2000); McCreary County v ACLU, 545 US 844, 860 (2005) (folding endorsement
considerations into a variant of the test in Lemon v Kurtman, 403 US 602 (1971)).
" Classic critical treatments include Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich L Rev 266 (1987),
and Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J L & Pol 499
(2002). For defenses of the endorsement test, see, for example, William P. Marshall, The
Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise jurisprudence, 66 Ind L J 351, 355
(1991); Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality: justice
O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32 McGeorge L Rev
837 (2001).
" See, for example, Samaha, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 137 (cited in note 12); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 Cap U L Rev 647, 665-66 (2006).
" For an interesting discussion, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme
Court, 114 Colum L Rev 1861 (2014) (discussing the virtues of the Supreme Court "pruning
but not abolishing" its precedents); see also id at 1863 n 2 (collecting examples of criticisms of
the Roberts Court for what some have called "stealth overruling" of Supreme Court prec-
edent); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda
v Arizona), 99 Georgetown L J 1 (2010).
"oMarsh, 463 US at 796 (Brennan, J, dissenting). I have elsewhere described Marsh and
similar cases as "historical easements" over the Establishment Clause. See Paul Horwitz, The
Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution 233-3 4 (Oxford, 2011).
n Horwitz, The Agnostic Age at 233-34 (cited in note 50) (discussing legislative prayer and
other practices, such as the use of the motto "In God We Trust" on coins or the phrase "one
nation under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, in those terms). See also Marsh, 463 US at
795 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (suggesting that the Court's "limited [historical] rationale should
pose little threat to the overall fate of the Establishment Clause").
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1818.
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Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that would
amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation.
The case teaches instead that the Establishment Clause must be inter-
preted by reference to historical practices and understandings. . . .
Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the
precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that
the specific practice is permitted. . . .The Court's inquiry, then, must be to
determine whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within
the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures."
This is hardly the end of the Court's analysis. Indeed, the re-
mainder of the opinion refers more often to current doctrine than to
historical materials. It is unlikely that the Court will abandon its
standard repertoire of Religion Clause tests. It is thus too early to
say that Galloway "marks a major inflection point in the development
of the law of the Establishment Clause."54
But it is surely true that the decision signals an important change
in "the treatment of history in Establishment Clause cases."" Rather
than treat Marsh as a historically based exception to the doctrinal
rules that govern most Establishment Clause cases, it treats Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine as a supplement. That doctrine enters in
only where history runs out. Any public religious practice that is well
settled in American history should need no further doctrinal justi-
fication."
The likely target of this passage is a narrow set of governmental
practices: those that are generally associated with American civil reli-
gion. Those practices have been the source of recent political and ju-
" Id at 1819. The Court has made a similar move in some recent free speech cases. See
United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 471 (2010) (holding that the Court will not recognize
new categories of so-called "low-value speech" unless the proposed category involves "his-
torically unprotected" speech); see also Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S Ct
2729, 2734 (2011) (to avoid the application of the rule of content neutrality, government must
provide "persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if hereto-
fore unrecognized) tradition of proscription"). One commentator has called this a "historical-
categorical" approach to low-value speech doctrine. Leading Cases, 126 Harv L Rev 196, 202
(2012). See also Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment's Epistemological Problem, 87 Wash L Rev
445, 460-61 (2012) (discussing this phenomenon).
* Rassbach, 2014 Cato S Ct Rev at 71 (cited in note 18).
Id at 89.
"See also Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1834 (Alito, J, concurring) ("[The Court of Appeals
appeared to base its decision on one of the Establishment Clause 'tests' set out in the
opinions of this Court, but if there is any inconsistency between any of those tests and the
historical practice of legislative prayer, the inconsistency calls into question the validity of
the test, not the historic practice.") (citation omitted).
6]
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risprudential controversy, such as the litigation over the recitation in
public schools of the Pledge of Allegiance.
As the Court's abortive and unconvincing attempt to address that
issue shows," there is general agreement on the Court that "civil
religion" practices should not be disturbed, either because they are
actually constitutional or because striking them down would be too
politically costly. But there has been little agreement on how to up-
hold them. The result, in the Pledge case at least, was a splintered
set of opinions, with no consensus on anything besides the result.
This is the probable significance of the "historical-categorical"
approach announced in Galloway. It provides a blueprint for reject-
ing at least some challenges to civil religion practices. That seems to
be the import of a later passage in the opinion, in which Kennedy
writes:
The prayer opportunity in this case must be evaluated against the back-
drop of historical practice. As a practice that has long endured, legisla-
tive prayer has become part of our heritage and tradition, similar to the
Pledge of Allegiance, inaugural prayer, or the recitation of "God save the
United States and this honorable Court" at the opening of this Court's
sessions."
In short, and despite Kennedy's insistence elsewhere in Galloway
that the imposition of civil religion is forbidden by the Constitution,59
the historical approach announced by Galloway provides a one-size-
fits-all method that will allow the Court to easily reject future chal-
lenges to the standard practices of American civil religion, without
repeating the difficulties that arose in the Pledge case. Never mind
that this passage casually mixes together genuinely long-established
practices, such as prayer at inaugural ceremonies, with far more re-
cent practices, such as the insertion of religious language into the
Pledge.6 0 The Court appears to have settled on a way to uphold these
practices on historical grounds. 1
" See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v Newdow, 542 US 1 (2004) (holding, on novel grounds,
that the plaintiff's father lacked standing to challenge the state law requirement of a teacher-
led Pledge of Allegiance on his own behalf and as his daughter's next friend).
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1825.
" See id at 1822.
60 See, for example, Act of June 14, 1954, ch 297, 68 Stat 249 (adding the words "under
God" to the Pledge of Allegiance); Steven B. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 NC L Rev 1865, 1875-79 (2003) (noting the Cold War origins
and purposes of the alteration of the Pledge).
6 Galloway. 134 S Ct at 1819.
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From here, the Court proceeded to reject the plaintiffs' two pri-
mary claims. First, the Court flatly rejected the plaintiffs' "insistence
on nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard" in
legislative prayer cases.62 Historically, this standard was inconsistent
with a long practice of sectarian references in legislative prayers in
Congress." Doctrinally, the Court rejected as dictum a suggestion to
the contrary in the Court's endorsement-oriented decision in the
holiday display case, County ofAllegheny.64
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the town board
should have reviewed the invocations in advance or provided man-
datory guidelines for their content. General Establishment Clause
principles bar the government from weighing in on questions of
religious truth" or involving itself deeply in religious matters and,
thus, approving or disapproving particular religious messages.66
The opinion also described the nature and purpose of acceptable
legislative prayer practices. Kennedy's language here was sweeping,
prescriptive, and faintly pious, with echoes of the thin public relig-
iosity of the Eisenhower era.6 ' Legislative prayers are "meant to lend
gravity to the occasion and reflect values long part of the Nation's
heritage."68 Proper legislative prayer "is solemn and respectful in
tone [and] invites lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals and com-
mon ends before they embark upon the fractious business of gov-
erning."69 As long as such practices "provide particular means to
6 Id at 1820.
6 Id at 1821, 1823-24.
6Id at 1821 22, discussing County of Allegheny, 463 US at 603 (arguing that "[t]he legis-
lative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this principle [that government practices
cannot demonstrate allegiance to a particular religious sect or creed] because the particular
chaplain had removed all references to Christ.") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
6 See generally Horwitz, The Agnostic Age (cited in note 50); Andrew Koppelman, De-
fending Amerilan Religious Neutrality (Harvard, 2013).
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1821 22, citing, among other cases, the Court's recent decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v EEOC, 132 S Ct 694, 705-06 (2012).
6 See Gary Scott Smith, Faith and the Presidency: From George Washington to George W Bush
254 (Oxford, 2006) (quoting Eisenhower's famous statement, "Our form of government has
no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith[,] and I don't care what it is.").
Mark Massa calls this an era in which religion in American public life entailed "high visibility
and almost contentless theology." Mark S. Massa, Catholics and American Culture: Fulton
Sheen, Dorothy Day, and the Notre Dame Football Team 130 (Crossroads, 1999) (emphasis
omitted). For discussion, see Paul Horwitz, Religion and American Politics: Three Views of the
Cathedral, 39 U Memphis L Rev 973, 978 (2009).
6 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1823.
69 Id.
6]
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universal ends," it doesn't matter that individual prayers are "given
in the name of Jesus, Allah, or Jehovah.""0
The Court imposed some limits. A couple of the invocations given
at town board meetings in Greece fell outside the acceptable range
of civic piety directed at "universal ends." One "lamented that other
towns did not have 'God-fearing' leaders."" Another, which was de-
livered after the plaintiffs had complained about Greece's practice,
criticized the objectors as "a 'minority' who are 'ignorant of the his-
tory of this country.'"2 Kennedy conceded that such prayers "strayed
from the rationale set out in Marsh,"" but held that "Marsh . . . re-
quires an inquiry into the prayer opportunity as a whole, rather
than into the contents of a single prayer."" Viewed as a whole, the
invocations in the town of Greece did not demonstrate "a pattern of
prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an imper-
missible government purpose."" But he warned:
If the course and practice over time shows that the invocations deni-
grate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach
conversion, many present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire
to elevate the purpose of the occasion and to unite lawmakers in their
common effort. That circumstance would present a different case than the
one presently before the Court.6
This passage accomplishes three things. First, by demanding proof
of a pattern of impermissible prayer practices, it raises the bar for
plaintiffs challenging legislative prayers. Second, notwithstanding the
opinion's stated preference for historical certainty over the kind of
ambiguity and discretion that critics attributed to the endorsement
test,n it gives a reviewing court a substantial amount of discretion."
Third, it allows the Court, in future cases, to step in and impose its
particular vision of legislative prayers, and their unifying civic pur-
70 Id.
"Id at 1824 (citation omitted).
2 Id (citation omitted).
7 Id.
' Id (citing Marsh, 463 US at 794 95).
7 Id.
"Id at 1823.
7 See, for example, Choper, 18 J L & Pol at 520 (cited in note 47).
"Not incidentally, it also makes a hash of Justice Kennedy's insistence that the Court stay
out of the job of "supervisor[ ] and censor[ ] of religious speech." Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1822.
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pose, against outliers.79 Given that Galloway makes clear that leg-
islative prayers are permitted not only in Congress and the fifty
states but in a vast number of local bodies as well,"o outliers there will
surely be.
Alabama provides a hell of an example. The Alabama Public Ser-
vice Commission is a statewide elected body that oversees rate-
setting for various utilities. Its president, Twinkle Cavanaugh, in-
vited a friend, a Baptist minister, to give an invocation at one meeting
in which he first "poll[ed] those present to see who believed in God,"
and then directly addressed the Lord: "We've taken you out of our
schools and out of our prayers. We have murdered your children.
We've said it's okay to have same-sex marriage. We have sinned and
ask once again that you forgive us for our sins."" Cavanaugh force-
fully defended the prayer.82
It is safe to say that this kind of prayer is unlikely to be unusual,
for Cavanaugh and at least some other elected officials and bodies.
At least some local politicians will surely, from time to time, see in-
vocations as an opportunity to practice a divisive form of local poli-
tics, not to ensure that "people of many faiths [are] united in a com-
munity of tolerance and devotion."" Although the requirement of
" See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?,
2010 Supreme Court Review 103 (agreeing with the general conclusion that the Court is
often responsive to majoritarian views but warning against excesses in this scholarship); Adam
Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U Pa J Const L 305, 309 (2010); Barry
Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and
Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (Farrar, Straus, 2009); Michael J. Klarman, From ]im
Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality 453 (Oxford, 2004);
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J Pub L 279 (1957).
o See, for example, Marie Wicks, Prayer Is Prologue: The Impact of Town of Greece on the
Constitutionality of Deliberative Public Body Prayer at the Start of School Board Meetings (working
paper 2014), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 2547761.
"Hunter Stuart, Alabama Government Agency Holds Prayer Against Abortion, Gay Marriage, Huf-
fington Post, July 25, 2013, online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/alabama-prayer
-gay-marriage n 3651756.html.
" Kristen Hwang, Twinkle Cavanaugh Stands by Controversial Prayer at Public Service
Commission Meeting, AL.com, July 31, 2013, online at http://blog.al.com/breaking/2013/07
/twinkle cavanaugh-adresses-pra.html.
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1823. See also Paul Horwitz, Learning from Bedrosian, Cavanaugh,
and Town of Greece v Galloway, PrawfsBlawg, May 7, 2014, online at http://prawfsblawg.blogs
.com/prawfsblawg/2014/05/learning- from- bedrosian- cavanaugh -and -town -of- greece -v
-galloway.html; Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer Goes Back to the Supreme Court, Slate,
Aug 15, 2013, online at http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2013
/08/the supremecourt will have another chance to decide when-government can.html
(noting, among other examples, the case of a small California town that considered ban-
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a practice of doing so makes it harder to win such claims, Galloway
makes clear that at least some members of the Court would gladly
intervene in such cases. Any apparent federalism or experimentalism
in the Galloway opinion is skin deep.
The Court concluded its treatment of the "sectarian prayer" issue
with another significant statement. It rejected the view of the Court
of Appeals that the town of Greece had erred because its process of
selecting prayer-givers, which "was limited by the town's practice of
inviting clergy almost exclusively from within the town's borders,"
resulted in a massive "preponderance of Christian clergy" giving the
invocations at board meetings." Justice Kennedy wrote:
The town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the congregations
located within its borders . . . . That nearly all of the congregations in
town turned out to be Christian does not reflect an aversion or bias on
the part of town leaders against minority faiths. So long as the town
maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not re-
quire it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in
an effort to achieve religious balancing."
I return to this point below."
The second major argument by the plaintiffs relied on Justice
Kennedy's expansive version of the coercion test." Speaking only for
himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy
rejected the contention that Greece's practice "coerces participation
by nonadherents."" He emphasized that the coercion test is "a fact-
sensitive one." But, in keeping with the opinion's enhanced attention
to history, he also stressed that "[t]he prayer opportunity in this case
must be evaluated against the backdrop of historical practice," in-
cluding its finding that "legislative prayer has become part of our
heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom."89
ning denominational prayers; "[i]n response, a citizens' group purchased billboard space on
nearby highways and threatened to display each council member's vote under one of two
columns-"For Jesus" and "Against Jesus."); Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the
Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 Minn L Rev 972, 974-76, 1045-46 (2010).
'Galloway, 681 F3d at 31.
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1824.
6 See Part II.B.
See generally Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1991).
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1824.
9 Id at 1825.
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Although the facts showed that the invocations were often "di-
rected . . . squarely at the citizens" and invited their personal par-
ticipation,9 Kennedy asserted: "The principal audience for these
invocations is not, indeed, the public but lawmakers themselves."9 1
Absent a "pattern and practice of ceremonial, legislative prayer . . .
to coerce or intimidate others," he refused to find coercion in the
simple fact that some audience members were offended or felt "ex-
cluded or disrespected" by the prayer practice: "Offense . . . does
not equate to coercion."92 Unlike the graduation ceremony in Lee v
Weisman, the audience here was composed mostly of adults; they
were free to enter or leave at any time, or to skip the invocation
entirely. 93
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a concurrence re-
sponding to Justice Kagan's dissent, which it accused of combining a
"niggling" central complaint with sweeping rhetoric that could have
broad effects. 94 Kagan's criticisms of Greece's prayer practice, Alito
complained, would lead logically to the conclusion that "prayer is
never permissible prior to meetings of local government legislative
bodies."9 5 By rejecting many common practices, he argued, the dis-
sent would, at best, permit "perfunctory and hidden-away prayer"
by legislative bodies, and at worst lead litigation-averse local gov-
o Id at 1848 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
9 Id at 1825. Again signaling his potential willingness to act in other cases, he added, "The
analysis would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in the
prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be
influenced by a person's acquiescence in the prayer opportunity." Id at 1826 (emphasis
added). Presumably, given the careful use of language here, no constitutional violation would
occur if a prayer-giver "directed the public to participate" or castigated "dissidents" in the
audience. If this happened habitually, however, one assumes Justice Kennedy might act.
9 Id at 1826.
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1827. Curiously, Justice Kennedy closed his discussion of the co-
ercion argument with a flat contradiction of an earlier statement in the same section of the
opinion. He had previously said legislative prayers were primarily intended not for the public
but for the legislators, "who may find that a moment of prayer or quiet reflection sets the
mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing." Now, however, he de-
scribed ceremonial prayers as having the "purpose and effect of acknowledg[ing] religious
leaders and the institutions they represent"-like some kind of introduction of the special
guests at a club banquet-not of excluding nonbelievers. See id at 1825, 1827. Not much
turns on this inconsistency, but it reflects poorly on the coherence of the opinion.
"Id at 1829, 1831 (Alito, J, concurring).
" Id at 1831.
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ernmental bodies to treat "local government [as] a religion-free
zone." 96
More directly than Kennedy, Alito also stressed the importance of
the fact that local legislative bodies have more limited resources than
Congress or state legislatures, and that their prayer practices will
reflect this. The dissent complained that the town had done an in-
adequate job of seeking invocations by representatives of different
faiths. For Alito, this boiled down to the view that "[t]he town's
clerical employees did a bad job in compiling the list of potential
guest chaplains."97 But whatever failings the town's employees had
manifested were "at worse careless, and . . . not done with dis-
criminatory intent."9 With greater care, the employee might have
"realized that the town's Jewish residents attended synagogues on
the Rochester side of the border" and added those temples to the
invitation list.99 The Court should not make a federal case out of the
failure to do so.
Similarly, local clergy lack the experience of the pros in Congress
or the state legislatures. If the prayer-givers here faced the public
rather than the board or began their invocations with "Let us pray,"
Alito said, they were simply behaving in a way that is "commonplace
and for many clergy, I suspect, almost reflexive."1oo Tellingly, he
exclaimed, "If prayer is not allowed at meetings with those charac-
teristics, local government legislative bodies, unlike their national
and state counterparts, cannot begin their meetings with such a
prayer" at all."o' Alito argued that the Court should recognize the
"informal, imprecise way" in which "small and medium-sized units
of local government" work. Provided that it did not act with dis-
criminatory intent, "then a unit of local government should not be
held to have violated the First Amendment simply because its pro-
cedure for lining up guest chaplains does not comply in all respects
with what might be termed a 'best practices' standard."102 In short,
9 Id at 1831, 1832.
Id at 1830.
Id at 1831 (Alito, J, concurring).
99 Id.
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given the importance of legislative prayer, the Court should cut lo-
cal officials some slack in their implementation of prayer policies.
Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice Scalia, filed a concur-
rence to reiterate his position that "the Establishment Clause is 'best
understood as a federalism provision"' that applies to Congress and
allows individual state establishments of religion.0 3 Even if the Es-
tablishment Clause were properly read as having been incorporated
against the states, he argued, the result here should not change,
because the conduct at issue bore "no resemblance to the coercive
state establishments that existed at the founding."04
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Soto-
mayor, filed the principal dissent in the case.05 Like the majority, her
opinion reflects a particular vision of "the" American church-state
settlement, and indeed of American political identity itself.06 She
announces it in an extended passage at the outset of the dissent:
Our Constitution promises that [Americans] may worship in their own
way, without fear of penalty or danger, and that in itself is a momen-
tous offering. Yet our Constitution makes a commitment still more re-
markable-that however those individuals worship, they will count as
full and equal American citizens. A Christian, a Jew, a Muslim (and so
forth)-each stands in the same relationship with her country, with her
state and local communities, and with every level and body of govern-
ment. So that when each person performs the duties or seeks the benefits
of citizenship, she does so not as an adherent to one or another religion,
but simply as an American.'
103 Id at 1835 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), quoting
Newdow, 542 US at 50.
1 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1837 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
osJustice Breyer filed a short solo dissent as well to "emphasize several factors that I
believe underlie the conclusion that, on the particular facts of this case, the town's prayer
practice violated the Establishment Clause." Id at 1839 (Breyer, J, dissenting). For present
purposes, the most significant factor pointed to in his opinion was the town's decision to
"limit[ I its list of clergy almost exclusively to representatives of houses of worship situated
within Greece's town limits," despite the proximity of houses of worship, such as several
Jewish temples, "just outside its borders, in the adjacent city of Rochester." Id at 1839, 1840.
As a result, "although it is a community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost ex-
clusively persons of a single faith." Id at 1841.
106 See Part II.
10 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1841 (Kagan, J, dissenting); see also id at 1851 ("In this country,
when citizens go before the government, they go not as Christians or Muslims or Jews (or
what have you), but just as Americans (or here, as Grecians)"), 1854 ("When the citizens of
this country approach their government, they do so only as Americans, not as members of
one faith or another").
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Strikingly, Justice Kagan quickly disclaimed any interest in re-
visiting the Court's decision in Marsh v Chambers."os This repre-
sented a departure from her liberal predecessors on the Court, three
of whom dissented in Marsh.10 9Justice Brennan, for example, argued
in Marsh that legislative prayer by any state legislature violated the
Establishment Clause and was "not saved either by its history or by
any of the other considerations suggested in the Court's opinion.""o
In contrast, Justice Kagan asserted that Marsh lends to legislative
prayer "a distinctive constitutional warrant by virtue of tradition,"
and declared that the Court was right to uphold Nebraska's prac-
tice."
Nevertheless, Kagan argued, a town board meeting differs from
state legislative proceedings. Individual members of the public can
interact with board members, "often on highly individualized mat-
ters."112 A different standard must perforce apply.1 The board must
"exercise special care to ensure that the prayers offered are inclu-
sive-that they respect each and every member of the community
as an equal citizen."" This, Greece's town board failed to do. Its
prayers were directed at the public, not the board members, and those
prayers were too "explicitly Christian.""' These factors "remove this
case from the protective ambit of Marsh and the history on which it
relied.""' It is allowed to have prayers, but it must "take especial care
to ensure that the prayers . . . seek to include rather than serve to
divide." 1
In practical terms, this means that one of two things ought to have
happened here. The town could have issued prayer-givers advance
instructions to "speak in nonsectarian terms, common to diverse
religious groups."" Or it could have allowed sectarian prayer, if it
10 Id at 1841-42.
10. See Marsh, 463 US at 795 (Brennan, J, dissenting) (joined by Justice Marshall), 822
(Stevens, J, dissenting).
110 Id at 796 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
" Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1845 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
112 Id.
113 Id at 1849 (town board must meet its own set of "constitutional requirements").
" Id at 1845.
Id at 1848.
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took care to "invite[ I clergy of many faiths to serve as chaplains." 119
This makes it sound as if Kagan is concerned only with process-as
if a good-faith effort to invite speakers of different faiths to give the
invocation would "transform[ ]" "even sectarian prayer" into some-
thing constitutional.120 A footnote in her dissent, however, suggests
that the town must also guarantee a fair result where sectarian prayers
are involved.121 In any event, Kagan argued, the town here fell short of
any acceptable process or result. The majority, she charged in closing,
failed to properly appreciate "the multiplicity of Americans' religious
commitments, along with the challenge they can pose to the project-
the distinctively American project-of creating one from the many,
and governing all as united."122
II. KENNEDY, KAGAN, AND "THE" AMERICAN RULE
OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Kennedy and Kagan agreed that Galloway called for "fact-
sensitive" analysis.1 2 3 Moreover, there was little significant disagree-
ment between them as to interpretive method. Both agreed that his-
tory and tradition were the primary interpretive tool here.124 One
might therefore conclude that the disagreement in Galloway was
mostly fact driven. But there is more to it than that.
The true fundamental disagreement between them concerns the
competing visions of American religious pluralism that animate their
opinions. It is this disagreement that helps us properly understand
Galloway. A consideration of that disagreement leads in turn to the
broader questions of religious geography that are the focus of this
"1 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id at 1845 n 2 (Kagan, J, dissenting) ("[Iln this citizen-centered venue, government
officials must take steps to ensure-as none of Greece's Board members ever did-that
opening prayers are inclusive of different faiths, rather than always identified with a single
religion."). See also id at 1851 (suggesting that, under conditions in which sectarian prayer is
permitted, "one month a clergy member refers to Jesus, and the next to Allah or Jehovah,"
and so on).
122 Id at 1853.
123 Id at 1825; see also id at 1838 (Breyer, J, dissenting), 1851-52 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
121 See, for example, id at 1845 (Kagan, J, dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that the
issue here is 'whether the prayer practice in the Town of Greece fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.") (quoting Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1819).
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article. Those larger questions also ultimately offer insights into two
more opinions in this case, those of Justices Thomas and Alito.
It is worth stressing first what the majority opinion and the
principal dissent have in common.125 As distant as they are on many
points of law and fact, they share a common denominator: both are
monistic and nationalist in orientation. In other words, each opinion
presents a single vision of American religious pluralism, one that is
meant to apply uniformly across the United States.
For Justice Kennedy, the vision is one of active, public, but
friendly American religiosity, an American religiosity that is in equal
measure hallowed and hollowed by tradition. That it is public, and
that it may be active-full-throated in tone, sectarian in content-is
clear from his opinion. He treats legislative prayer with great ap-
proval, calling it a "benign acknowledgment of religion's role in so-
ciety."126 He insists on the value of allowing chaplains at official events
"to express themselves in a religious idiom."12 That idiom can be
sectarian, not just "generic."128 People are entitled to use public pro-
ceedings as an opportunity to "show respect for the divine in all as-
pects of their lives and being."129
Thus, prayer isn't just permissible: it is a positive good. But it is a
particular kind of public good. It serves an essentially civic purpose.
It is about unifying the nation, albeit through sectarian language, and
hallowing the public affairs of a democratic republic. It "lends gravity
to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty differences
in pursuit of a higher degree, and expresses a common aspiration to
a just and peaceful society."130 There may be an element of religion for
religion's sake in these prayers. But in Kennedy's account, there is,
125 Consider Perry Dane, Prayer I Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, Rutgers J L
& Religion *28 (forthcoming), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id= 2535931 ("Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Kagan's dissent are much
more alike than either author seems to have supposed," in that neither "really treats prayer as
serious business-serious theological business," and both "reduce civic prayer to essentially
political declarations of identity").
116 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1819.
1 Id at 1820.
1 Id at 1820-21.
Id at 1823.
130 Id at 1818. See also id at 1823 (prayer at the beginning of a legislative session "is meant
to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long part of the Nation's heritage, . . . [to]
invite[] lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals and common ends before they embark on the
fractious business of governing").
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centrally, a civic element as well. Thus, in describing congressional
prayers, he writes, "[T]heir purpose is largely to accommodate the
spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a tradition dating
to the time of the Founders.""1 Their goal is to "provide particular
means to universal ends."132 Those universal ends have to do with the
civic virtues attendant upon governing, not with the personal religious
goals of worship or salvation.
For Kennedy, legislative prayer is necessarily civil as well as civic.
Prayer must be "solemn and respectful in tone," inviting reflection
"upon shared ideals and common ends.""' It aims to realize the prin-
ciple of "e pluribus unum"-to show that "people of many faiths may
be united in a community of tolerance and devotion."1 4 Thus,
notwithstanding Kennedy's assertion that neither legislators nor
courts should scrutinize or impose conditions on the content of
individual prayers, he emphasizes that there must be "an inquiry into
the prayer opportunity as a whole," to ensure that the process of
selecting and holding legislative prayers ensures reasonable equal
access to the opportunity to pray.3 And not the process alone: the
content of the prayers is also open to scrutiny. A recurring practice of
prayers, no matter how sincere and devout, that "denigrate nonbe-
lievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, [ preach con-
version," or "betray an impermissible government purpose" may re-
quire judicial intervention. 6
Perry Dane has written of Kennedy's description of permissible
purposes for legislative prayer in Galloway: "Conspicuously missing
in this list . . . is the most obvious purpose of genuine prayer-to
pray."' This may be too harsh but is surely close to the mark. Al-
though it disclaims any interest in having legislators or judges "act as
supervisors and censors of religious speech,"' the Court in fact
assigns itself this very role. It does so in the interest of serving what
131 Id at 1826 (emphasis added).
132 Id at 1823.
133 Id (emphasis added).
134 Id.
131 Id at 1824; see also id at 1831 (Alito, J, concurring) ("I would view this case very dif-
ferently if the omission of [the] synagogues were intentional.").
1 3 Id at 1823, 1824.
13 Dane, Rutgers J L & Religion at *18 (cited in note 125).
13 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1822.
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Justice Kennedy thinks is the right kind of legislative prayer: prayer
that respects religious differences but puts them to work to achieve
"values that count as universal."139 Sectarian references to God are
acceptable only if God agrees to play nice and work well with others.
If God has another message-that Democrats are sinners, that Re-
publican policies stink in the nostrils of the Almighty, that some "di-
visions along religious lines" 40 are important and true and call upon
us to bear witness to them-the Lord can deliver it somewhere else.
Compared to the vision of religious pluralism offered by the dis-
sent, this may be a "thick" form of religious diversity, as Chad Flan-
ders has suggested.' But only compared to the dissent. By normal
standards, this is not "no holds barred" prayer.142 To the contrary, it
is a highly constrained and distinctively American sort of prayer, of-
fered in "a kind of optimistic and voluntaryistic spirit."4
In contrast, Flanders is quite right to call the vision of American
pluralism offered in Justice Kagan's dissent a "thin" version of reli-
gious diversity.1" Like Kennedy's version of religious pluralism, hers
serves a particular version of what she sees as a single American
creed. Like Kennedy, Kagan sees this "distinctively American proj-
ect" as one of "creating one from the many, and governing all as
united."' Like Kennedy-and unlike the dissenters in Marsh-she
does not believe that project requires the elimination of religion
from legislative proceedings.'
Nevertheless, there are some differences in Kagan's conception
of that American project, and many differences in how she would
achieve it. The key message of her vision of American identity is
" Id at 1823.
'o Id at 1819.
1 Chad Flanders, Religious Diversity, Thick and Thin, SCOTUSblog, May 6, 2014, online
at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/05/symposium-religious-diversity-thick-and-thin/.
142 Id.
143 Marty, Religion and Republic at 245 (cited in note 2).
1 Flanders, Religious Diversity (cited in note 141).
1 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1853 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
4 Although, unlike Kennedy, Justice Kagan has little that is positive to say about the
practice upheld in Marsh. She agrees, apparently, with the Court in Marsh that legislative
prayer is "a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country." Marsh, 463 US at 792; see Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1845 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Beyond this, however, she has nothing else to say in justification of the practice, and mostly
accepts it not for its own sake but because it "has a constitutional warrant by virtue of tra-
dition." Id at 1844.
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summed up by the telling phrase, "only as Americans": "When the
citizens of this country approach their government, they do so only
as Americans, not as members of one faith or another."'
Of course there is something right about this. Kagan is speak-
ing of the duties and benefits of citizenship as such, not all aspects
of the citizen's life. Still, any language referring to citizens as being
"only" Americans, especially in this context, calls to mind a decades-
old complaint of religiously devout Americans: that they have been
subjected to a set of public rules that require them to "bracket" their
political selves from the "essential aspects of one's very self."' 8 It calls
to mind, too, the response that devoutly religious people give to this
requirement: that this kind of bracketing, if it is possible at all, consti-
tutes a kind of "annihilat[ilon]" of key aspects of one's self.1'
It is, no doubt, easy to be unfair to Justice Kagan's point here.50
I stress again my assumption that Kagan means only that one's reli-
gion should not be a cause of good or bad treatment at the hands of
government, not that one cannot or must not be publicly religious.
Nevertheless there is something remarkably tone-deaf in her lan-
guage. If this were a different case, involving a different aspect of
one's identity, one might wonder what it means to speak to govern-
ment as "only an American." One expects not to be treated differ-
ently by government because of one's gender, for example. But one
need not therefore assume that it is possible to attain a state of pure
"' Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1854 (Kagan, J, dissenting); see also id at 1841 ("[V]hen each
person performs the duties or seeks the benefits of citizenship, she does so not as an adherent
to one or another religion, but simply as an American."), 1845 (repeating the phrase "only as
Americans").
14 Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Esay 181 (Oxford, 1988); see
also Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures ofBelief and Disbelief 92 Mich L Rev 1873, 1875-76
(1994) (book review) (finding similarities between Perry's complaint and those of one of the
books under review, Stephen L. Carter, The Culture ofDisbelief How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion (BasicBooks, 1993)).
149Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law at 181 (cited in note 148).
Especially because, as Perry Dane points out, Kagan does state that individual responses
to the invocations given at town meetings and other legislative proceedings "reveal[ ] a core
aspect of identity-who that person is and how she faces the world." Galloway, 134 S Ct at
1853 (Kagan, J, dissenting); see Dane, PrayerL Serious Business, Rutgers J L & Religion at *16
(cited in note 125) (commending Kagan for recognizing "that religious particulars matter and
that religion can constitute a 'core aspect of identity"'). It is striking, nevertheless, that
Kagan's recognition of this fact appears only in a discussion of the possibility of audience
members' negative reactions to prayer, and nowhere else. It certainly does not seem to have
shaken her conviction that one can talk meaningfully about a citizen being "only an Amer-
ican."
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"American-ness" that involves not having a gender at all. Even for
those devoutly religious Americans who oppose legislative prayer al-
together, Kagan's language is bound to rankle, and to recall past
battles over the seeming requirement that one bring an "unencum-
bered self" to one's civic activities.151
Kagan also differs from the majority in the rules she believes must
govern legislative prayer if it is to be consistent with the "dis-
tinctively American project." Those rules are determinedly-and
relentlessly-egalitarian.152 They leave the town with one of two
choices." It may insist that all the invocations given are nonsec-
tarian. Or, whatever the actual religious makeup of the audience, it
may require a constant turnover of faiths among those giving the
invocation. Only in those circumstances may government see fit to
allow those giving the invocation to mention the name of their deity
or deities, or to add any meaningful religious content to their re-
marks." In short, it can either regulate religious speech, demanding
that each speaker "tone down [his or her] particular faith,""' or it can
ensure that both the process and the result of the legislative prayer
process observe a kind of lockstep diversity.
Given the uncertainties inherent in the second option-what if
the invitations don't yield a diverse range of speakers? What is a
sufficiently diverse range of speakers? Will a court impose any ad-
ditional restrictions on what those speakers say?-a government body
15 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 66
(Belknap, 1996). See also Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 Harv L Rev 1765, 1774
(1994) (book review) ("Why should our political identities not express the moral and religious
and communal convictions we affirm in our personal lives? Why insist on the separation
between our identity as citizens and our identity as moral persons more broadly conceived?"),
1793-94 ("[D]emocratic politics cannot long abide a public life as abstract and decorous, as
detached from moral purposes, as Supreme Court opinions are supposed to be. A politics that
brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its own disenchantment. . . .
[Political liberalism's] vision of public reason is too spare to contain the moral energies of a
vital democratic life.").
15 See Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1852 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (calling the town board's approach
to legislative prayer "determinedly-and relentlessly-noninclusive"). See also id at 1841
(describing the animating vision of her dissent as one of "religious equality"). The move on
and off the Court from a focus on liberty as the lodestar of the Religion Clauses to a primary
concern with equality is itself significant, although it is not the primary concern of this article.
Consider Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 Cal L Rev 673 (2002).
113 Not, as she writes, "multiple ways." Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1851 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
Id at 1850-51.
1 Flanders, Religious Diversity (cited in note 141).
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facing such a choice might well take option one, the insistence on
nonsectarian prayer, in the interest of avoiding litigation. Thus, as a
practical matter Kagan's approach might quickly reduce to a system
of so-called "ceremonial deism" and little else."'
These are significant differences with the majority, to be sure.
Ultimately, however, I find both opinions unsatisfying."' Although
Kennedy and Kagan's opinions have been labeled as "thick" and "thin"
versions of religious pluralism, respectively," both seem rather thin.
Neither writer offers an especially rich account of prayer, legislative
or otherwise. Both rely on "armchair psychology."159 For Kennedy,
this leads to the placid assumption that religious minorities will wel-
come sectarian prayers at legislative sessions "as historically benign
parts of our common expressive idiom.""o For Kagan, the armchair
psychology has less to do with her assumption that sectarian prayers
may "exclude and divide,"' and more to do with her incuriosity
about whether an insistence on nonsectarian prayer will have the
same divisive effect on religiously devout Americans, and her confi-
dence that it is possible for an individual to approach the govern-
ment as "only an American."
Judges are not novelists. It is less important that they write rich,
imaginative opinions than that they provide stable and workable res-
olutions of disputes.162 But it is hardly clear that either opinion ac-
complishes that goal either. When will a prayer practice cross the line
into an impermissible "course and practice" of denigration or pros-
elytization? 6 What is the dividing line between sectarian and non-
sectarian language?' When does a pattern of sectarian prayer by
15 Id; see also, for example, Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L Rev 1545, 1549 (2010) (defining ceremonial deism as in-
volving governmental invocations of God that are of a long-standing nature and whose
"religious impact is minimal and nonsectarian").
" For similar sentiments, see generally, for example, Dane, Rutgers J L & Religion (cited
in note 125); Flanders, Religious Diversity (cited in note 141).
" See Flanders, Religious Diversity (cited in note 141).
5 Dane, Rutgers J L & Religion at *17 (cited in note 125).
'o0 Id.
161 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1851 (Kagan, J, dissenting). This is Dane's complaint. See Dane,
Rutgers J L & Religion at *17 (cited in note 125).
162 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U Chi L Rev 1455, 1455-56
(1995).
163 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1823.
" Id at 1851 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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different faiths meet the requirement of being sufficiently "inclu-
sive"? 6 ' The residue of uncertainty left behind by both opinions is
something else they have in common.
The most important common point between the majority and
the principal dissent, however, is that each opinion offers a single
vision of American religious pluralism. Both insist that the circum-
stances of legislative prayer vary greatly and that any judicial res-
olution of such disputes is "fact-sensitive.""' But neither seems to
think that American religious pluralism itself is subject to any var-
iation. The American religious historian Bret Carroll has written that
"the religious meaning of the national space is as multiform and as
much the stuff of public pluralistic wrangling as the religious culture
within it, varying from individual to individual, group to group, lo-
cality to locality, and region to region.""' Both Kennedy and Kagan
simultaneously ignore and exemplify this point. Each attempts to
declare definitively the meaning of American religious pluralism: the
rules that govern it, the responses that citizens will have to different
regimes, the "distinctively American project" that it represents.' In
attempting to invest American religious pluralism with "a single au-
thoritative meaning,"169 neither stops to reflect that there may be
no such meaning. It is little wonder that neither opinion feels true
to life, or that neither seems likely to resolve the legislative prayer
controversy. It is to this point-to the role of geography in church-
state relations, and the diversity of American religious pluralism-
that I now turn.
111. LAW, RELIGION, AND GEOGRAPHY IN GALLOWAY
AND ELSEWHERE
Eric Rassbach has written that Galloway marks the rise of a
new principle in Religion Clause interpretation, in which "the his-
torical background of the religion clauses serves to delineate their
1 Id at 1845 n 2.
Id at 1825; see also id at 1851-52 (Kagan, J, dissenting), id at 1838 (Breyer, J, dis-
senting).
" Bret E. Carroll, Worlds in Space: American Religious Pluralism in Geographic Perspective, 80
J Am Acad Religion 304, 341 (2012). I am grateful to Professor Sarah Barringer Gordon for
first pointing me to this valuable article.
1 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1853 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
1 Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 335 (cited in note 167).
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scope today.""o If so, Galloway's emphasis on religious history calls
to mind a warning delivered long before the American Revolution:
"For as Geography without History seemeth a carkase without mo-
tion[,] so History without Geography wandereth as a Vagrant with-
out a certaine habitation.""' Galloway purports to give a historical
account of legislative prayer and its relation to American church-
state law. What is missing from that account, however, is a sense of
American religious pluralism as a spatial phenomenon, not just a
temporal one. Without that spatial sense, the opinions in this case
are rendered incomplete and unpersuasive.
Religious studies scholars have long recognized the value of ex-
ploring the "complex relationships between religion and the geo-
graphical motifs of space and place."1 7 "Geographical perspectives,
focusing on the concepts of space and place," says a leading text on
religion and geography, "are crucial in understanding essential as-
pects of religion as an expression of human culture."" A burgeon-
ing literature has "provid[ed] substantial insights into humanity's di-
verse religious traditions and their relationships with the geographical
contexts within which they have developed." 1 4
Religious historians also recognize the importance of geogra-
phy. Writing fifty years ago, Sidney Mead argued that those who
seek to understand the "lively experiment" in religious liberty in
the United States must focus on space, not just time. Compared
to the centuries of development in European history, Mead wrote,
"[t]here really was not much time in America for the traditionally
antagonistic religious groups to learn to live together in peace."1
What they did have was space-"practically unlimited geographical
and social space," space "so vast that space came to take precedence
over time in the formation of their most precious ideals," including
religious liberty.1 71 Just as different spatial circumstances suggested
0' Rassbach, 2014 Cato S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 18) (discussing Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S
Ct 694).
" Captain John Smith, General Historie of the Bermudas (1624), quoted in Edwin S.
Gaustad, The Geography of American Religion, 30 J Bible & Religion 38, 38 (1962) (citing
Goldwin Smith, The Heritage of Man 464 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960)).
"' Stump, The Geography of Religion at 4-5 (cited in note 8).
113 Id at 6.
'Id at 5.
Mead, The Lively Experiment at 13 (cited in note 6).
6 Id at 7, 14-15.
6]
270 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
different models of religious and political coexistence, so different
individuals, groups, and sects reacted differently to the opportuni-
ties and challenges that this vast new space represented. The result
was "a strange mingling of attitudes toward the predominant con-
ception of [religious] freedom""'-a variety, not a unity, of concep-
tions of American religious freedom. In the years since Mead wrote,
a substantial literature has engaged those questions."8 This litera-
ture studies the historical importance of American "religious geog-
raphy":1 79 the ways in which Americans' religious practices, and their
social and legal structures, were shaped and reshaped in response to
the physical and political landscapes they inhabited.
Religious geography and its effects on American religious plu-
ralism are visible at a number of levels, or "geographical scales."so
This part focuses on developments in American religious geogra-
phy at two levels: regional and local. Both help shed light on the
various opinions in Galloway.
A. REGIONALISM AND COMPETING MODELS OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
The use of regions has been a linchpin of studies in American re-
ligious geography since the 1960s."' Their usefulness as a measure
of American religious life has been questioned from the outset.18'
Id at 15.
See, for example, Shelby M. Balik, Rally the Scattered Believers: Northern New England's
Religious Geography (Indiana, 2014); Gaustad and Barlow, New Historical Atlas of Religion in
America (cited in note 1); Bret E. Carroll, The Routledge Historical Atlas of Religion in America
(Routledge, 2000); David Chidester and Edward T. Linenthal, American Sacred Space (Indiana,
1995); Robert Orsi, ed, Gods ofthe City: Religion and theAmerican Urban Landscape (Indiana, 1999).
Balik, Rally the Scattered Believers (cited in note 178).
Stump, The Geography of Religion at 223 24 (cited in note 8); see also Lily Kong,
Mapping "New" Geographies of Religion: Politics and Poetics in Modernity, 25 Progress Hum
Geog 211, 226 (2001); Tracy Neal Leavelle, Geographies of Encounter: Religion and Contested
Spaces in Colonial North America, 56 Am Q 913, 928 (2004); Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at
317 (cited in note 167).
m See Bret E. Carroll, Reflections on Regionalism and U.S. Religious History, 71 Church Hist
120, 120 (2002); Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 318 (cited in note 167). The subject is
generally traced back to an article by the American cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky, and
a historical atlas by the American religious historian Edwin Scott Gaustad. See Wilbur Ze-
linsky, An Approach to the Religious Geography of the United States: Patterns of Church Mem-
bership in 1952, 51 Annals Ass'n Am Geographers 139 (1961); Edwin Scott Gaustad, Historical
Atlas of Religion in America (Harper & Row, 1962).
"' See generally Laurie F. Maffly-Kipp, Putting Religion on theMap, 94J Am Hist 522 (2007).
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People move in and out of these regions constantly; religious tra-
ditions themselves evolve, and wax and wane in popularity. The
nature and number of faiths and cultures in the United States has
exploded since the elimination of national origin quotas in the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1965.183 Some argue that even if
American geographical regions were once culturally distinct, they
have been smoothed over by a "national cultural convergence" that has
blurred the distinctions between different regions."'
The notion of American religious regionalism is thus imprecise
and imperfect, and should be approached with caution. Its creators
admitted this, warning that any geographical schema that attempts
to represent "the enormous complexity of U.S. religious history" in-
volves a significant, even dangerous, degree of generalization.' Nev-
ertheless, regionalism remains a popular device among scholars of
the history and geography of American religious pluralism, and has
picked up subsequent empirical support. 1 6
The picture of American religious regions has also been filled out
significantly by a multiyear project conducted by the Leonard E.
Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life at Trinity
College, in Hartford, Connecticut. Aided by the empirical work of
the American Religious Identification Survey, this project, called
"Religion by Region," has resulted in a series of edited collections
that provide a deep statistical, demographic, and cultural analysis
of American religious life at a regional level."' The Religion by Re-
" Pub L No 89-236, 79 Stat 911, amending INA § 201 et seq, codified as amended 8 USC
§ 1151 et seq.
"William M. Newman and Peter L. Halvorson, Atlas ofAmerican Religion: The Denomi-
national Era, 1776 1990 30 (AltaMira, 2000).
1 Carroll, 71 Church Hist at 121 (cited in note 181), quoting Gaustad, Historical Atlas of
Religion in America at x (cited in note 181).
1 See Carroll, 71 Church Hist at 122 26 (cited in note 181).
See Andrew Walsh and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public Life in New England: Steady
Habits, Changing Slowly (AltaMira, 2004); Randall Balmer and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and
Public Life in the Middle Atlantic Region: The Fount of Diversity (AltaMira, 2006); Philip Barlow
and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public Life in the Midwest: America's Common Denominator?
(AltaMira, 2004); Jan Shipps and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public Life in the Mountain West:
Sacred Landscapes in Transition (AltaMira, 2004); Patricia O'Connell Killen and Mark Silk, eds,
Religion and Public Life in the Pacific Northwest: The None Zone (AltaMira, 2004); Wade Clark
Roof and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public Life in the Pacific Region: Fluid Identities (AltaMira,
2005); Charles Reagan Wilson and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public Life in the South: In the
Evangelical Mode (AltaMira, 2005); William Lindsey and Mark Silk, eds, Religion and Public
Life in the Southern Crossroads: Showdown States (AltaMira, 2005). The work is summarized in a
helpful additional volume by the project's director and associate director. See Mark Silk and
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gion project is highly relevant to an analysis of the Court's decision
in Town of Greece v Galloway. It suggests, Bret Carroll writes, that
the nation's religious regions are definable not only by their demographic
profiles but by distinct, geographically and culturally conditioned styles of
pluralism-characteristic kinds of alliances and tensions among the worlds
occupying the regional spaces.'
Below, I summarize the standard picture of American religious
regions, and each region's model of American religious pluralism.
The reader is again duly cautioned that these regions, although use-
ful, are neither precise nor scientific. Another important aspect of re-
ligious geography-the distinction between different localities, such
as cities, suburbs, and towns-is elided here, although I take it up be-
low. I then consider the implications of the regional picture of Amer-
ican religious pluralism for the main opinions in Galloway.
The Middle Atlantic region consists of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.
It is home to a greater proportion of Catholics and Jews than the
nation as a whole. Its Christian population is composed largely of
mainline denominations; only here and in New England do main-
line Protestants significantly outnumber evangelical denominations.
It is marked by "strong links between religious and ethnic identity."
Its characteristic form of religious pluralism is one of negotiated co-
existence between ethnocultural groups: a "functioning ecology in
which each community finds its niche under an umbrella of shared
values." It features "a tradition of ecumenical cooperation and in-
terfaith undertakings" between the major groups. The classic mid-
century description of "tri-faith" American religious pluralism, made
famous by Will Herberg's book Protestant-Catholic-Jew, is really just
the Middle Atlantic model writ large.189
New England consists of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachu-
setts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Once the base of strict
Andrew Walsh, One Nation, Divisible: How Regional Religious Differences Shape American Pol-
itics, paperback ed. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). I draw heavily on that book, as well as the
descriptions in Bret Carroll's superb article on American religious geography, in this section.
See Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 318 27 (cited in note 167). For the sake of economy, I
have tried to keep footnotes to a minimum and to corral them at the end of each paragraph.
Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 319 (emphasis added) (cited in note 167).
See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 2-3, 15-40 (cited in note 187); Will Herberg,
Protestant- Catholic-Jew (Doubleday, 1960); Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 319-20 (cited in
note 167).
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Puritan Christianity, it is now "the least Protestant region of the
country." More important than its Puritan past is the Protestant-
Catholic tension that burst onto the scene in the nineteenth century
as a result of Irish immigration to the region. That tension produced
this region's own model of religious pluralism: not the mid-Atlantic
regime of intercultural cooperation, but the establishment of "geo-
graphically parallel religious worlds," separate enclaves with dupli-
cate sets of social institutions. Under this regime, religion belongs "at
the level of the individual, the family, and the voluntary religious
community." Within the "democratic public realm,. . . citizens [do]
not impose sectarian demands on one another[,] in order to preserve
civic peace." This is the pluralism of the 1960 presidential election,
and John F. Kennedy's half-sincere, half-strategic insistence that re-
ligion play no role in public life. It is the same vision that led the Su-
preme Court in the early 1960s to strike down school prayer.1 90
The South consists of Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, the Car-
olinas, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. It is heavily evan-
gelical in orientation; even mainline Protestantism tends to adopt a
more evangelical tilt in this region. It is a region of self-declared cul-
ture warriors, defenders of "traditional religious values" against the
forces of secularism and cultural change. Perceived as a powerful
threat by secularists and liberals, from its own perspective it is cul-
turally, religiously, and "spatially on the defensive. "191
"The Southern Crossroads-Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
and Missouri-looks like the South plus Roman Catholics." Its Cath-
olic population is twice that of the South. Much of the remainder is
evangelical, including Pentecostal, Holiness, and Charismatic denom-
inations. It is the region with the fewest members of minority faiths.
Historically a region of "political and religious clashes of pronounced
intensity," it retains that intensity today across a range of social and
religious issues, including a fierce attachment to the lowering of the
wall between church and state. It shares the South's political and so-
cial views. But it lacks the South's gentility and approaches flash-
point issues, including church-state conflicts, with the gloves off. Its
19o See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 3-4, 41-62, 211-12 (cited in note 187);
Carroll, 80J Am Acad Religion at 326 (cited in note 167); Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962);
Abington School District v Schempp, 374 US 203 (1963).
191 See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 5-6, 63-84 (cited in note 187); Carroll, 80 J
Am Acad Religion at 324 25 (cited in note 167).
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"harder-edged culture-warriors," in both religion and politics-fig-
ures like James Dobson of Louisiana and Tom DeLay of Texas-
spearheaded much of the national culture war of the 1990s and
2 OOOs. 192
California, Hawaii, and Nevada comprise the Pacific. Its reli-
gious mix is unique in many respects. For example, survey data sug-
gest that "more residents of the Pacific identify with Eastern re-
ligions than with any of the mainline Protestant denominations,"
although the number of both is still relatively small. It is the re-
gion with the second highest proportion of the population that
identifies with no religion at all. It is a region of "loosened" and
"eclectic" religious commitments, in which many individuals freely
adopt aspects of various faiths in a piecemeal fashion, or simply create
views and practices of their own. Particularly in the last several de-
cades, it has been home to an increasing number of committed con-
servative Protestants. But there is no dominant faith in the region,
and no historical tradition of a dominant faith. (In the 1950s, only
3 percent of the public schools in western states engaged in "Bible
readings and devotional practices," compared to 77 percent in the
South.) The Pacific culture is one of "liquid modernity": of fluidity
and "obligatory tolerance and individualism."193
Even more visibly than regions like New England, the approach
to religious pluralism of the other two western regions is deeply de-
pendent on the land-in this case, the land's natural features as well
as its social characteristics. These regions thus provide a different
and important approach to religious pluralism.
The Pacific Northwest-Oregon, Washington, and Alaska-is vast
and variegated. Its religious makeup is noteworthy for the large
number of "unchurched" individuals claiming no affiliation to a par-
ticular denomination, and for containing the largest number of
Americans claiming no religious affiliations of any kind. This has
earned it the sobriquet "the None Zone." It has a substantial Catho-
lic population and a substantial number of evangelical Christians.
19 See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 6-7, 85-108, 214-15 (cited in note 187);
Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 325-26 (cited in note 167).
" See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 7-9, 109-34 (cited in note 187); Carroll, 80J
Am Acad Religion at 321 22 (cited in note 167); Wade Clark Roof, Pluralism as a Culture:
Religion and Civility in Southern California, 612 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci 82 (2007).
The phrase "liquid modernity" comes from Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Blackwell,
2000).
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Unlike in the South, however, they are more likely to be Pentecostal
or nondenominational Christians than Baptists. These demographic
and physical attributes have led to two particularly noteworthy re-
sponses. First, the "fragility of the individual sectarian enterprises"
has led to a tradition of "ecumenical and interfaith cooperation," a
necessary "pooling [of] moral and financial resources." Second, there
is a substantial regional divide between the urbane "nones" in the
western parts of the region and the more religious, conservative,
traditionalist Christians on the eastern side. These religious dis-
senters from the norms of cities like Seattle or Portland comprise a
kind of "evangelical counterculture." One writer has suggested that
it should be seen not as a "separate sectarian world in permanent
confrontation with the surrounding culture," but as "a dissenting
parallel community" of its own.194
The Mountain West-Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Colo-
rado, Wyoming, and Montana-is the nation's "preeminent oasis,
or archipelago, region." It features a few urban communities, iso-
lated within vast unpopulated spaces. Other regions, such as the Mid-
dle Atlantic, require modes of pluralism that allow different faiths to
coexist in the same small space. The different communities in the
Mountain West do not, and have come up with three different mod-
els of pluralism instead. Taken together, they constitute a "'libertar-
ian' variety [of pluralism] in which each spiritual community stak[es]
out its own turf."195
The "Catholic heartland" of Arizona and New Mexico experi-
enced conflicts over control of public institutions like the schools-
controlled here by Catholics. After court rulings mandated strict
separationism within the public schools, it responded by developing
rival private school systems. It has also been the site of repeated con-
flicts with Native American tribes over access to sacred sites. The
mountainous regions of Colorado, Wyoming, and Montana, rather
than being characterized by any particular faith or any form of in-
terfaith cooperation, are the sites of multiple "scattered enclaves."
" See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 9-10,135-55 (cited in note 187); Carroll, 80
J Am Acad Religion at 324 (cited in note 167). For further discussion of the evangelical
counterculture of the Pacific Northwest, see James K. Wellman, Jr., Evangelical vs. Liberal:
The Clash of Christian Cultures in the Pacific Northwest (Oxford, 2008).
19 Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 322 (cited in note 167) (quoting Mark Silk, Defining
Religious Pluralism in America: A Regional Analysis, 612 Annals Am Acad Polit & Social Sci 64,
78 (2007)).
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Those include both Native American reservations and non-native
enclaves. Prominent examples include Boulder and Colorado Springs,
"two cities separated by less than 100 miles but spiritually worlds
apart": the first awash in both secularism and Eastern or syncretic
spirituality, the second a hub for conservative evangelical groups
such as Focus on the Family. Finally and most famously, there is the
"Mormon corridor" of Utah and Idaho, dominated by the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It is arguably "the only part of
the United states that today possesses a de facto if not a de jure re-
ligious establishment."196
The Midwest, a sort of common denominator for the nation as
a whole, may "provid[e] the model for religion in American pub-
lic life in the twenty-first century." It consists of a large number
of states-Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Iowa, the Dakotas, Kansas, and Nebraska-lacking the common ties
of other regions. It is as religiously and ethnically diverse as the
Middle Atlantic region, but "different geographic conditions have
generated differences of both religious demography and pluralistic
style." It is a "[slolidly pluralistic" region, lacking either a single dom-
inant faith or deep rivalries between different faiths. At the same
time, it is not subject to the privatizing impulses of New England
politics. It features "a tradition of tolerant religious pluralism, high
rates of religious adherence, and folkways that place considerable
stress on the public value of religion." It favors a state that is reli-
giously neutral; unlike New England, however, it is favorably dis-
posed toward religiosity in public. This partly reflects the greater
presence of evangelical Christianity in the Midwest, with an accom-
panying focus on common, publicly pronounced values and virtues.
But Midwestern evangelicals are more moderate in their public ex-
pressions of faith than their southern co-religionists.19
Two key observations emerge from this account of the "array of
geographically defined pluralisms" that help define American life.1 9 8
These observations apply across what might be called social, geo-
graphical, political, and historical space. They not only help reveal the
19 For this and the previous paragraph, see Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 10-11,
157-79 (cited in note 187); Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 322-25 (cited in note 167).
19 See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 11-12, 181-204, 224-32 (cited in note 187);
Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 320-21 (cited in note 167).
" Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 327 (cited in note 167).
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nature of current conditions in American religious and public life.
They also reflect changing legal and political arrangements con-
cerning church-state relations over the past several decades, roughly
since the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause
against the states.199 These observations fill in this article's analysis
of Galloway. They help explain why the primary contending opinions
in that case come off as thin, unsatisfactory, and unlikely to achieve
lasting consensus in American church-state relations.
The first point should be obvious from the preceding regional
survey. Nevertheless, it is routinely overlooked in American church-
state scholarship. That field focuses heavily on the decisions of fed-
eral courts, especially the Supreme Court.200 Those heavily nation-
alist, centralized sources are supplemented by slices of founding-era
history, and by abstract theorizing about religious liberty.201 The lit-
erature tends toward generalized statements about "American reli-
gious pluralism" that treat the nation and its religious and political
culture as a single, unparticularized whole.202 Although law and reli-
gion scholars are aware that different American colonies "developed
distinctive patterns of dealing with difference,"20 3 they view the his-
torical narrative as moving toward a single, final rule or regime of
American pluralism. They have been incurious about the extent to
which those distinctive approaches, while evolving considerably, re-
main in place today. This is precisely the conclusion that the regional
account of American religious pluralism suggests.
199 See Everson v Bd. of Education, 330 US 1 (1947).
200 This is a general problem in constitutional law scholarship. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
Against the Law Reviews, Legal Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004, online at http://legalaffairs.org/issues
/November-December-2004/review-posner novdecO4.msp (lamenting the undue focus in
the law reviews on the Supreme Court and the relatively few decisions it issues each year, and
legal scholarship's comparative neglect of lower court decisions). I acknowledge the irony of
saying so in this particular venue.
20' See Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J Contemp Legal Issues
59, 92-93 (2013) ("[Mlost scholarship on law and religion, including much of the best of it,
privileges ideas over interests. It invokes history, but it tends to emphasize intellectual history
rather than a more jaundiced and institutionally focused historical analysis. It is also top-
heavy with theory. In our field, a page of Rawls often outweighs a volume of financial or
demographic data.").
202 See Paul Horwitz, Demographics and Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit on Graduation Prayer
in Duval v. Adler County, 63 U Miami L Rev 835, 881-87 (2009); Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev
at 1813-19 (cited in note 12).
203 Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a "Christian County" Has Now Become the
World's Most Religiously Diverse Nation 37 (HarperOne, 2001).
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The regional account also says something important about the
variety and nature of those versions of pluralism. They tend to take
a number of specific forms, adapted to the demographic, denomina-
tional, and political mix of each region, its history, and its landscape.
They include the religious pluralism regimes, such as those of the
Middle Atlantic or New England, that we are most familiar with and
that form the basis of standard judicial and scholarly accounts of
religious pluralism in the context of the Establishment Clause. The
Middle Atlantic's regime involves peaceful coexistence, with openly
religious language permitted and welcomed. New England's consists
of peaceful coexistence under a rule discouraging or forbidding reli-
gious language in the public square.
As our regional survey suggests, however, there are other regimes.
One we might call a "sorting" approach to religious pluralism.204 The
Mormon corridor offers an example: the use of migration (and ex-
pulsion) and "geographical distance" to establish a distinctive "soci-
ety in the west that actualized [the Mormons'] highest theology and
governed their everyday lives."205 Another is the "enclave" strategy,
as in Oregon or Colorado: the establishment of separate communi-
ties, each reflecting the religious views and social preferences of its
residents. Still another we might call, drawing on the Dutch experi-
ence, "pillarization": the creation of parallel sets of institutions serv-
ing different religious and other communities, living side by side in
the same larger community.206 At one time, this was New England's
answer to religious conflict.
The second observation comes from the conclusion to Silk and
Walsh's summary of the Religion by Region project. There, they
argue that our understanding of the "national narrative" of Amer-
ican church-state relations may be altered and enriched by what we
have learned about American religious regionalism.20
On this view, the various "postwar dispensations" that have char-
acterized American attempts to come to terms with religious diver-
2 See Samaha, 2005 Supreme Court Review 135 (cited in note 12).
20s Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 164 (cited in note 187).
206 See, for example, Stephen V. Monsma and J. Christopher Soper, The Challenge of
Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies 56-60, 84-85 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2d ed
2009).
20' Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 205 (cited in note 187).
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sity, and establish rules and norms (political and legal) to manage our
pluralism, did not come about by happenstance. Nor did they come
directly from early American history, by way of some oracle sitting
on the Supreme Court,208 or from some effort to obtain "constitu-
tional meaning . . . by interpreting the materials in accordance with
the best available political-moral theory."2 09 Rather, and by whatever
mechanism, those dispensations have come from, or bear a remark-
able resemblance to, our regional models of pluralism. Some of
those models have been influential mostly at a political or cultural
level. At other times, they have been expressed more directly in the
legal regimes that defined the Establishment Clause in different
postwar periods.
The 1950s regime, for example, has been characterized as one
of relative religious unity and peacefulness. Its spirit was captured
in Herberg's Protestant-Catholic-Jew, a classic picture of a "tri-faith
America"210 that was publicly pious without being riven by sectar-
ian division, largely because of its focus on "Judeo-Christianity."21 1
This settlement manifested in various legal actions formalizing an
openly, if thinly, religious American creed-in the amended Pledge
of Allegiance, in the insistence that "In God We Trust" be stamped
on our coins, and in the placement of Ten Commandments dis-
20 See, for example, Everson, 330 US at 8-15 (offering a stylized picture of the "background
and environment of the period in which [the] constitutional language [of the Establishment
Clause] was fashioned and adopted," replete with references to "freedom-loving colonials,"
"abhorren[t]" practices, and the "dramatic climax" of the Virginia legislative debate over the
tax levy for the support of religious ministers).
20' Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 Harv L
Rev 1869, 1901 (2009) (book review).
21 See Kevin M. Schultz, Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to
Its Protestant Promise (Oxford, 2011).
" See, for example, Anna Su, Separation Anxiety: The End of American Religious Freedom?,
30 Const Comm 127, 138-39 (2015) (book review). Eisenhower's famous statement, "Our
government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care
what it is," comes from this period. As Andrew Koppelman observes, the line that followed
this one is less remembered, but it is fully consistent with the equation of religious pluralism
with the dominant Judeo-Christian triumvirate: "With us of course it is the Judeo-Christian
concept[,] but it must be a religion that all men are created equal." Andrew Koppelman,
Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 1831, 1885 (2009)
(quoting Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics: Religion and America Since World War 1140 (Touchstone,
1988)). See also Silk, 612 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 67 (cited in note 195) (noting
that the phrase "Judeo-Christian" was popularized in a series of conferences held at Co-
lumbia University, of which Eisenhower later served as president, and that Eisenhower's
famous remarks were delivered in an address to the Manhattan-based Freedoms Foundation).
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plays on government property.2 12 Those actions would pose doc-
trinal dilemmas for future Courts.2 13 At the time, however, they
were simply the accepted religious, political, and legal landscape of
the era.
As Silk and Walsh point out, the vision of American religious
pluralism that undergirded these practices was strikingly similar, if
not identical, to the Middle Atlantic approach to pluralism. The tri-
faith settlement was not equally relevant or applicable everywhere
in the nation. To the contrary, it little resembled demographic or
political conditions in many parts of the country. Nevertheless, the
Middle Atlantic settlement defined the culturally and politically dom-
inant themes of the era at a national level. Its model of "distinct
ethnoreligious communities[,] minding their own business in rea-
sonable harmony" with one another, provided a useful "image of the
several separate but equal tribes of American religion pulling to-
gether against the common Communist foe."2 14
When this regime gave way, it was succeeded by the modern New
England approach to pluralism: the view that "religion should be
kept clear of the political fray, that the civic order functions best
when religion is confined to the private sphere of individuals and
faith communities."21 The nation's demographic makeup had not
changed overnight. But the New England dispensation suited the
times. In particular, it suited a presidential candidate, John Ken-
nedy (himself a New Englander), who needed to convince Protes-
tants that his Catholicism was irrelevant to his role as president.216
In addition to political and cultural dominance, this settlement be-
came dominant on the Supreme Court. Beginning with its rulings
21 See Frederick Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo- Christianity and
the Ten Commandments, 110 W Va L Rev 275, 282-83 (2007).
213 See, for example, Van Orden v Perry, 545 US 677 (2005) (examining a challenge to a Ten
Commandments display on state property); Newdow, 542 US 1 (getting rid of a challenge to
the requirement that schoolchildren say the Pledge of Allegiance, including the "under God"
language). As I suggested above, this is the difficulty that Justice Kennedy attempts to dispel
for good in Galloway, by giving the Court's advance blessing to any public religious practice
that it adjudges to be sufficiently long-standing to form part of our "heritage and tradition."
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1825 ("As a practice that has long endured, legislative prayer has be-
come part of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom, similar to the Pledge of
Allegiance, inaugural prayer, or the recitation of 'God save the United States and this
honorable Court' at the opening of this Court's sessions.").
214 Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 211 (cited in note 187).
215 Id.
216 Id; see also Horwitz, 39 U Memphis L Rev at 978 95 (cited in note 67).
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striking down school prayer,2 1 the Court struck down a number
of pietistic public practices compatible with the earlier, Middle
Atlantic-oriented approach to pluralism but incompatible with the
New England regime.218 "[T]he ideology of church-state separa-
tionism in fact reached its high-water mark during the Kennedy
era."219
Other regional approaches to American religious pluralism have
corresponded to changing views and trends in other periods of post-
war history. For example, the rise of the Religious Right from the
mid-1970s through today, with an accompanying increase in con-
frontationalism over religion and its public role,22 0 suggests a chal-
lenge to the prior pluralism regimes from a Southern, and ultimately
a more aggressive Southern Crossroads, perspective.221 The South-
ern Crossroads approach continues to influence American political
culture. But Silk and Walsh argue that the election of Barack Obama,
who is more openly religious than a figure like Kennedy but less in-
sistently sectarian than some of his opponents or predecessors, indi-
cates the national ascendancy of the Midwestern model of religious
pluralism. 22 2 Despite the strictures she would place on legislative
prayer, it may be that Justice Kagan's eagerness to affirm it, rather
than reject it as earlier liberal Justices did, buttresses this thesis.
Clearly, one should not accept this analysis unskeptically or ap-
ply it too mechanically. Among other things, Silk and Walsh do not
explain clearly how and why particular regional settlements came
to the fore in particular eras. The story they offer is arguably too
neat, too cute. Nevertheless, they provide a compelling case for the
conclusion that there is "an abiding geography of American reli-
gion." 223 It manifests itself in particular regional cultures and ap-
2 See Engel, 370 US 421; Schempp, 374 US 203.
2 See Gedicks and Hendrix, 110 W Va L Rev at 283 & n 53 (cited in note 212) (citing
other examples).
21 Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 212 (cited in note 187).
220 See generally Steven P. Miller, The Age of Evangelicalism: Americas Born-Again Years
(Oxford, 2014).
221 See Silk and Walsh, One Nation, Divisible at 215 (cited in note 187) (noting the ultimate
passage of leadership roles in politics and within politically active religious organizations from
Southerners to individuals from states within the Southern Crossroads region).
222 Id at 226.
223 Gaustad, 30 J Bible & Religion at 38 (cited in note 171).
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proaches to pluralism that move in and out of prominence at the
national level.
Many writers, including legal scholars, think about religious plu-
ralism only at the national level. They treat the various regimes
that have characterized national culture and politics-the separation-
ist model, the civil religion model, the forceful "Christian nation"
model, and so on-as representing a unitary form of American plu-
ralism, rooted in American history but unrooted from particular
places. Each model has its champions; each champion assumes that
the goal is the triumph of the "right" model of American religious
pluralism. The regional story of American religious pluralism that
we have examined here, and the fact that each transient national
regime has corresponded to a particular regional model of plural-
ism, casts doubt on the entire enterprise, and on this entire way of
thinking about American religious pluralism.
In short, it is a mistake to conclude that any given regime that
has been hailed as the correct form of American religious plural-
ism is the final, definitive answer to the American church-state di-
lemma. It is also wrong to conclude that any such regime draws its
authority directly from Founding-era historical sources, or from ab-
stract theories of religious liberty. Rather, we should see each pro-
posed model of American religious pluralism or church-state rela-
tions as just one of many regional regimes. Each is likely to come in
and out of national prominence, briefly appearing to be the solu-
tion to American church-state relations but eventually being chal-
lenged or supplanted by some other region's approach.
This lesson applies directly to the Supreme Court's decision in
Galloway. It suggests that there is a significant obstacle to the mo-
nistic, nationalizing project pursued, albeit with different results,
by both Justice Kennedy and Justice Kagan and their brethren in
Galloway, with the customary-and solitary-exception of Justice
Thomas.
In their own way, both Kennedy and Kagan seek to present and
entrench a single vision of American pluralism, one that results in a
single correct model of legislative prayer. Each one, as it turns out,
resembles one or more of the regional regimes that have competed
for national prominence. In his confidence that legislative prayer-
even if it turns out to be primarily Christian-will help "lawmakers
to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose," and
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that sectarian but generic religious language can "provide particular
means to universal ends,"224 Justice Kennedy draws heavily on the
language and ideas of the Middle Atlantic settlement. In his state-
ment that "willing participation in civic affairs can be consistent with
a brief acknowledgment of [ ] belief in a higher power,"225 he sounds
like a latter-day Eisenhower, insisting on the importance of a vague
but essentially Judeo-Christian "deeply felt religious faith" in public
life.226
Justice Kagan's approach resembles a combination of the Mid-
western and New England settlements. Her apparent endorsement
of legislative prayer evokes the Midwestern faith in the importance
of public religiosity in expressing our common values. At the same
time, the stringent rules she would impose on legislative prayer sug-
gest a deeper fear that public religiosity will inevitably "divide [Amer-
icans] along religious lines." 22 7 That is the New England strain in
her dissent.
The point is not that one or the other approach is right or
wrong. Each has its share of wisdom. It is that each represents just
one of many possible church-state settlements. A regional exami-
nation of American religious life leads inexorably to the conclusion
that "American religious pluralism can be understood as in fact
consisting of an array of geographically defined pluralisms."2 28 As
long as these different pluralisms are ingrained in the history and
culture of different regions, there is little chance that any one of them
will command the permanent allegiance of all Americans. On the
ground, American religious pluralism is too varied-by history, ge-
ography, culture, and circumstances-for all Americans, whatever
their region, to subscribe to a single, final solution to the problem
of American religious diversity and church-state conflict. 229 It is un-
224 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1818, 1823.
225 Id at 1827-28.
226 Horwitz, 39 U Memphis L Rev at 978 (cited in note 67).
22 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1854 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
22 Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 327 (cited in note 167) (emphasis added).
229 Consider Marty, Religion and Republic at 247 (cited in note 2) ("Whatever happens,
however, it seems clear that not all human needs can be met by secular interpretation and
private faith, by tri-faith or conventional denominational life, or by a common national re-
ligion. New particularisms will no doubt continue to arise, to embody the hopes of this
'people of peoples."').
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surprising that both Kennedy and Kagan's proposals, despite the
confidence with which each is put forward, come off as thin, in-
complete, and unconvincing.
B. LOCAL AMERICAN RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: URBANITY,
HOMOGENEITY, AND BORDERS
Our geographical account of Galloway now shifts from the re-
gional to the local: to "the cities, towns, and neighborhoods where
interreligious encounters are most immediate," and where "what is
at stake in the pluralist dynamic is felt most directly."230 Here, reli-
gious geography's lesson is simple, subtle, and essential: "[Rleligious
groups do not simply exist in space; they also imagine and construct
space in terms related to their faith."231 The legal lesson is similar:
"[Religiously] identified space interacts with [religion] -neutral legal
doctrine and public policy to enforce" religious dominance and its
exclusionary effects.232
Figuratively and literally, these lessons intersect with Galloway
at an imaginary line on a map: the line dividing the town of Greece,
as a political jurisdiction, from the places where some of its people-
an identifiable religious minority-worship. That imaginary line is
crucial for the outcome in Galloway.
We begin with a preliminary point, one that is well known but
often overlooked.23 3 As I have argued, discussions of American re-
ligious diversity are often highly general in nature. They describe
the United States as a whole as religiously diverse, without delving
much into how those faiths are distributed.234 The story is quite dif-
ferent on the ground. Some locales are incredibly religiously diverse.
Elsewhere, a single religion-or even a denomination-dominates,
with only a few members of minority faiths present.235
..0 Carroll, 80 J Am Acad Religion at 327 (cited in note 167); see also John C. Blakeman,
The Religious Geography of Religious Expression: Local Governments, Courts, and the First Amend-
ment, 48 J Church & St 399, 399-401 (2006).
231 Stump, The Geography of Religion at 23 (cited in note 8).
232 Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 Harv L Rev 1841, 1845 (1994).
233 For previous efforts to address it, see Horwitz, 63 U Miami L Rev at 881-92 (cited in
note 202); Paul Horwitz, Of Football, "Footnote One," and the Counter-Jurisdictional Establish-
ment Clause: The Story ofSanta Fe Independent School District v. Doe, in Richard W. Garnett and
Andew Koppelman, eds, First Amendment Stories at 481, 500-10 (Foundation, 2011).
231 Horwitz, 63 U Miami L Rev at 882 (cited in note 202).
231 See id at 886.
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In the former condition, which represents the condition of urban-
ity in places like New York, Los Angeles, or Chicago, religious di-
versity may produce tension and conflict.236 But it is also more likely
to lead to cooperation and negotiation.2 3 There will always be ex-
ceptions.23 But the more religiously diverse a locality is, the less
likely it is that any single faith will be politically dominant. Rather,
it is far more likely that all religious (and nonreligious) stakehold-
ers will broker an inclusive compromise. In areas that are completely
homogeneous, peace may be achievable for the opposite reason: with
no minorities to be dissatisfied or disadvantaged, the local practice
will satisfy everyone.
Still, the former state of affairs only applies in the metropolis,
and the latter is almost entirely hypothetical. The reality is that many lo-
cations are neither completely heterogeneous nor completely homo-
geneous. Rather, they are overwhelmingly religiously homogeneous,
dominated by one faith but always with some religious minorities.
Religious minorities in such locales may find that they live in the
worst of all possible worlds. They will be confronted by practices
that exclude or disadvantage them, and subject to both legal and ex-
tralegal harassment if they dare come forward and object.239 Courts
may step in when such conduct occurs-if a plaintiff can be found
and convinced to step forward-ending the harassment and halting
the offending public religious practice. But doing so may in turn
leave the majority with its own sense of injury, and further exacerbate
existing conditions of religious conflict.2 4 0
The solution is unclear as a matter of first principles. Some fa-
vor a decentralized approach that would allow each jurisdiction to
236 See Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev at 1814 (cited in note 12) (arguing that "the American
experiment in pluralism is only truly tested under conditions of urbanity").
23 See Roof, 612 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 93 (cited in note 193) (noting that
religious leaders serving the immigrant communities of southern California are "well-
educated urban leaders who appreciate diversity, openness, and the necessity of coopera-
tion").
23 See, e.g., Bronx Household ofFaith v Board ofEduc. of City ofNew York, 750 F 3d 184,188-
89 (2nd Cir 2014) (recounting "long-running litigation" in which the New York City Board
of Education repeatedly refused to accommodate a religious group seeking equal access to
school facilities on weekends); Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet I No Substitute for
Constitutional Rights, 32 HarvJ L & Pub Pol 29, 41-42 (2009) (discussing this case and noting
that the litigation had been in progress for some fifteen years as of the date of publication of
that article).
231 See, for example, Horwitz, 63 U Miami L Rev at 887-88 (cited in note 202) (offering
examples); Horwitz, The Story of Santa Fe Independent School District at 488, 495, 502, 504
(same) (cited in note 233).
24 See, for example, Samaha, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 147 (cited in note 12).
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establish its own practices. 24 1 Others argue that the Establish-
ment Clause should be read to favor an "anti-sorting" principle, un-
der which the goal is to encourage the dispersal rather than the
concentration of religious faiths in any particular jurisdiction. On
this view, "national standards for religious liberty would be better
than local political discretion and the resulting policy variance. "242
In contrast to both of these options, I have argued that, despite the
resurgence of the view that the Establishment Clause forbids fed-
eral religious establishments but not state or local ones,243 condi-
tions on the ground suggest that "the Establishment Clause might
be better understood, at least in the modem era, as being more prop-
erly concerned with state and local establishments of religion than
with federal establishments of religion."244
For now, the answer to that question is unimportant. What is im-
portant is that Establishment Clause doctrine does not formally
recognize the problem. Doctrine in this area is indifferent to the
"institutional scale" and location of government action. As Richard
Schragger has observed, it assumes that the same rule applies, no
matter the size, scale, or nature of the governmental actor involved.245
The result is cases like Galloway. The Court paid lip service to
the notion that the Establishment Clause inquiry must be "fact-
sensitive," giving attention to "both the setting in which the prayer
arises and the audience to whom it is directed." 246 In reality, it showed
little interest in the question whether a town board ought to be treated
differently than Congress or a state legislature for purposes of a chal-
lenge to legislative prayer. Any curiosity it had on this question was
satisfied by the citation of a scintilla of evidence that legislative prayer
by local governmental bodies also "has historical precedent." 24 7 Nor
was it curious to discover what the nature and effect of these prac-
tices has been for religious minorities, whether it has eased or pro-
2 See, for example, Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev at 1815-16 (cited in note 12).
2 Samaha, 2005 Supreme Court Review at 138 (cited in note 12).
243 In Galloway, that argument is advanced (as usual) by Justice Thomas, writing alone on
this point. See Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1835 (Thomas, J, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
24 Horwitz, 63 U Miami L Rev at 891 (cited in note 202); see also Horwitz, The Story of
Santa Fe Independent School District at 504-08 (cited in note 233).
2 See Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev at 1813, 1816-17 (cited in note 12).
2 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1825.
2 Id at 1819.
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voked local political division along religious lines, or anything else.
Neither Justice Kennedy's majority opinion nor Justice Kagan's
principal dissent, moreover, so much as mention Justice Thomas's
opinion, which at least discussed the issue, albeit strictly on original-
ist and federalist grounds. Whatever the answer to the question how
to address "the role of the local in the doctrine and discourse of re-
ligious liberty"24 8 should be, it must at least be acknowledged and
addressed directly.
Town of Greece v Galloway poses another interesting issue at the
level of the local in religious and political geography. This issue con-
cerns the boundaries of the town of Greece itself. The resources
for analyzing this issue do not come from religious geography. They
come from the field of legal and political geography more gener-
ally.249 In particular, scholarly treatments of the relationship between
religious geography and Establishment Clause doctrine may learn a
great deal from the study of the relationship between geography
and race. A number of scholars have recognized the importance of
the similarities and differences between race and religion, although
that work has been mostly intermittent and preliminary in nature. 250
Here, I draw primarily on the work of Richard Thompson Ford, who
has employed the political geography literature to examine the re-
lationship between race and the drawing of political boundaries.2 51
One of Ford's central points is that legal boundaries, like the lines
that demarcate a political jurisdiction such as the town of Greece, are
often taken as givens-as natural, necessary, or both. We must or-
ganize our affairs somehow, after all. We do so by drawing lines,
and then assigning votes, representation, responsibility for providing
2 Schragger, 117 Harv L Rev at 1813 (cited in note 12).
2 For useful resources, see Blomley, Delaney, and Ford, eds, Legal Geographies Reader
(cited in note 10); Braverman et al, eds, Expanding Spaces of Law (cited in note 10).
2o See, for example, Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality and Entrenchment, 87 NYU
L Rev 393 (2012); Pamela S. Karlan, Taking Politics Religiously: Can Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clause Cases Illuminate the Law of Democracy?, 83 Ind L J 1 (2008); Mary Anne Case,
Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion Clauses?, 2000 Supreme
Court Review 325; Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the juris-
prudence of Race and Religion, 73 Ind L J 119 (1997); Thomas C. Berg, Religion, Race, Segre-
gation, and Districting: Comparing Kiyas Joel with Shaw/Miller, 26 Cumb L Rev 365 (1996);
Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L Rev 2059 (1996);
Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 Cor-
nell L Rev 491 (1994); Kenneth L. Karst, Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power
in the Politics of Race, Gender and Religion (Yale, 1993).
2" See especially Ford, 107 Harv L Rev 1841 (cited in note 232).
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public services, and other markers of legal and political rights and
duties according to those lines. Sometimes we treat those boundaries
as mere creations-as "'governmental technique[s]"' 252 -albeit val-
uable ones.2 53 At other times, we treat boundaries as real things, not
arbitrary creations but necessary consequences of the land and our
place in it: "We imagine that the boundaries that define local gov-
ernments . . . are a natural and inevitable function of geography and
of a commitment to self-government or private property. "254
Where race is concerned, Ford writes, these views of political
geography, and the ability to toggle between them, can "justify [po-
litical or] judicial failures to consider the effect of boundaries and
space on racial segregation."25 5 Milliken v Bradley256 provides a use-
ful illustration. There, the Supreme Court held that a district court
school busing remedy designed to address de jure racial segregation
in Detroit's public schools could not extend to the predominantly
white suburban school districts ringing the city. It achieved this out-
come by treating those political boundaries as demarcating two en-
tirely separate, autonomous political units, and the suburban districts
as thus being disconnected from the de jure segregation that had
occurred in Detroit itself.
But those lines were not drawn by accident or as a result of the
demands of physical space. They were a product of deliberate white
flight from Detroit, and of the willingness of government to draw
political lines in a way that would reflect, if not actively accommo-
date, that phenomenon. A single governmental entity-the state of
Michigan-was ultimately behind the drawing of jurisdictional lines
in this manner. By "fail[ing] to examine the motivation for the posi-
tion of local jurisdictional boundaries," the Court allowed-even en-
couraged-the entrenchment of segregation in both communities.25
Galloway, too, involves an invisible line, a political boundary, that
turns out to be significant-or, in another sense, oddly insignifi-
" Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (a History offurisdiction), 97 Mich L Rev 843, 846
(1999), quoting Holt Civic Club v City of Tuscaloosa, 439 US 60, 72 (1978).
253 See Ford, 107 Harv L Rev at 1857 (cited in note 232) ("Legal boundaries are ... [often]
imagined to be either the product of aggregated individual choices or the administratively
necessary segmentation of centralized governmental power.").
254 Id.
255 Id.
25'418 US 717 (1974).
25 See id at 1875-76.
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cant-to the outcome in the case. One of the plaintiffs in Gallo-
way was Jewish,258 and it is unquestioned that Greece had Jewish
residents. But the town never invited any representatives of local
synagogues to give the invocation. Instead, the invocations re-
mained almost uniformly, explicitly Christian.259 A number of Jew-
ish synagogues were located just outside the boundaries of the town,
in Rochester.260 Although the town argued that the overwhelmingly
Christian nature of the invocations was simply "the result of a ran-
dom selection process," it was obvious to the Second Circuit that
limiting invitations to pray to individuals and groups within the town's
borders was hardly "random," given the certainty that the town's
residents might "hold religious beliefs that are not represented by a
place of worship within the town."261
That conclusion is surely correct. But it did not detain the Court
in Galloway. For Justice Kennedy, it sufficed that the town "made
reasonable efforts to identify [and invite] all of the congregations
located within its borders."262 The Constitution, he said, as if the
matter were obvious, "does not require [the town] to search beyond
its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve
religious balancing. "263
As with Milliken, this begs the question. Why, given the facts,
was it "reasonable" to treat the town's official boundaries as an ac-
ceptable limit for issuing invitations to prayer-givers? Even if one
takes for granted that a line must be drawn somewhere, why treat
this particular line on the map as the stopping point? The town's ju-
risdictional lines are significant, to be sure. But they are not natural.
They were drawn; they could be redrawn. The Galloway Court invests
the political boundary of Greece with a disproportionate constitu-
25 Galloway, 732 F Supp 2d at 196.
25 After the plaintiffs had begun complaining and taken legal action, the town eventually
invited a "Jewish layman" to deliver an invocation. See id at 219 n 41. As it turns out, the
plaintiffs also found that prayer objectionable. See id at 209.
26 See, for example, Galloway, 681 F3d at 24. A MapQuest search for local synagogues,
combined with an examination of the official boundaries of the town of Greece, available
online at http://greeceny.gov/files/Ward%20Map/2014%o2OTowno20of%20Greece%20Ward
%20Map.pdf, confirms the presence of local synagogues and suggests that two local synagogues
were located a mere four and a half miles outside the town lines.
Galloway, 681 F3d at 31.
Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1824.
263 Id.
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tional significance. Other local facts, like the location of the syna-
gogues where Greece'sJews worship and the resulting failure to invite
any rabbis to give the invocation, are treated as unfortunate but
necessary casualties of this invisible jurisdictional line. It may not be a
wholly arbitrary line. But that does not make it the right line.
For that matter, it is not necessarily an innocent one. As Alan
Brownstein has observed, it is common "[o]utside of large urban
and suburban centers" for religious minorities to build a house of
worship in one town, "with the understanding that this congrega-
tion will serve the religious needs of adherents who live in neigh-
boring communities as well."264 That practice may simply reflect
the need to find a geographically central location for a synagogue
or other house of worship in a region in which religious minor-
ities will find themselves dispersed in small numbers throughout
the villages, towns, and suburbs that dot that area. In other cases,
it may be an artifact of an older tradition of residential segrega-
tion, which at one time was aimed at religious and ethnic groups
such as Jews, as well as racial groups.265 Justice Kennedy displays
no doubt whatsoever of the constitutional sufficiency of the town's
jurisdictional lines as the basis for its decision whom to invite to give
the invocation. He should.
The most interesting and thoughtful discussion of political bound-
aries in Galloway comes not from Kennedy, but from Justice Aito's
concurrence. Aito is especially concerned with ensuring that the
practice of holding opening prayers at town meetings not be derailed
by the "informal, imprecise way" in which "small and medium-sized
units of local government" conduct their operations.266 Requiring
more care and greater "exactitude," he complains, would "pressure
towns to forswear altogether the practice of having a prayer before
meetings of the town council."26 The fact that the synagogues in the
" Alan Brownstein, Town of Greece v. Galloway: Constitutional Challenges to State-Sponsored
Prayers at Local Government Meetings, 47 UC Davis L Rev 1521, 1532 (2014).
26 See, for example, Garrett Power, The Residential Segregation ofBaltimore's Jews: Restrictive
Covenant or Gentlemai's Agreement?, Generations, Fall 1996, at 5. In a brief blog post, Mark
Tushnet has wondered whether a similar phenomenon might have been at work in that
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area were located across the town line in Rochester sufficed, in his
view, to explain the town's failure to issue invitations to those houses
of worship. It should not "be held to have violated the First Amend-
ment" simply because it did not "comply in all respects with what
might be termed a 'best practices' standard."268
This is a fascinating passage. Alito's basic point-small towns
do not have all the resources, staff, or experience that larger gov-
ernmental units, certainly including Congress and the state legis-
latures, have-is surely correct. Why this fact demands the abandon-
ment of rigorous constitutional standards is quite another matter.
But that, in essence, is Alito's conclusion. Anything less than a de-
liberate attempt to discriminate should be forgiven, lest a town be re-
quired to forgo the practice of having sectarian legislative prayers. 269
Of all the Justices writing in Galloway, Alito is the most sensi-
tive to "the scale of government action and to the fact that local
governments and state and federal governments are differently sit-
uated with respect to their citizens."2 70 In the end, however, the
tail wags the dog in his opinion. He is far more concerned about
maintaining sectarian legislative prayer in small and medium-sized
towns than he is interested in considering the problems involved
in doing so. He disdains the imposition of "best practices," lest they
interfere with those towns' prayer practices; but he says little or
nothing about what, in the circumstances, might constitute good
practices, or even reasonable ones.
If he had, he might have considered the possibility-one that is
bound to be common across the United States-that a town's po-
litical boundaries may have nothing to do with its religious makeup,
and that many communities may be ringed by houses of worship that
26 Id.
261 See id (noting that the town's manner of putting together a list of invitees "was at worst
careless, and it was not done with a discriminatory intent").
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might have. She is, in short, more interested in the what than the where of different gov-
ernmental bodies.
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serve a community but lie outside its political boundaries. Indeed, it
might have occurred to him that sometimes, however innocent the
current actors may be, this phenomenon might be an artifact of past
efforts to keep religious minorities, or their houses of worship, out-
side those jurisdictional lines.
What might this phenomenon demand in practice? Should it
have required the Court to reject altogether the possibility of lo-
cal legislative prayer, or to impose on local communities the kinds
of demanding tests that Justice Alito fears could never be satisfied?
Although I personally believe that a proper reading of the Estab-
lishment Clause casts doubt on the propriety of legislative prayer
at any level of government,2 1 I think that, assuming that legislative
prayer continues to exist, it is possible to come up with standards for
its exercise that do not render it impossible for local governmental
bodies to maintain such a practice. The answer is not the extreme
deference-almost indifference-that Alito's concurrence suggests
should govern in such cases. Nor is it the rather blunt binary choice
that Justice Kagan's dissent offers, in which legislative prayer must
remain rigidly nonsectarian, or government can allow sectarian in-
vocations only if it ensures an unspecified degree of religious diver-
sity as the outcome of its prayer practices.2 2
Rather, the solution to the dilemma of local religious pluralism
is exactly what one would expect from a geographically aware ap-
proach, one that is "attentive to the local quality of church-state
relations," as Richard Schragger has urged.2 73 In judging the consti-
tutionality of particular local legislative prayer practices, courts-
and, more importantly, the governments that craft these policies in
the first instance-should rely on actual local conditions and demo-
graphics, not on political boundaries. In deciding whom to invite to
2 See Horwitz, The Agnostic Age at 233-34 (cited in note 50).
2 Indeed, it is not clear that Kagan's binary solution is an especially appropriate remedy to
the problem outlined in the text. Imagine a community, somewhat like Greece, in which the
religious minority is not invited to give the invocation because its houses of worship are
located outside the town's boundaries, but the invocations that are given-always by members
of the majority religion in that community-are resolutely nonsectarian. This state of affairs
would appear to be permissible under Kagan's dissent. But it would not address the real
problem, and I doubt that the nonsectarian nature of the prayers would wholly mitigate the
justified sense of exclusion on the part of the religious minority in that community.
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give invocations, local governmental bodies should look to what its
citizens actually believe, not to the location of their houses of wor-
ship (if any). Most obviously, if a substantial number of houses of
worship are located just outside its official boundaries, it should rec-
ognize the obvious significance of that fact and invite someone from
those groups to give the invocation. It should not treat their location
as a basis for excluding them from consideration altogether. It need
not require all invocations to be nonsectarian; indeed, a policy that
did so, but that failed to ask anyone other than representatives of the
local majority faith to give those invocations, would be just as indif-
ferent to local conditions as the town of Greece's policy was. What it
must do is make some effort to actually ascertain the religious makeup
of the community and spread its invitations to a wide swath of those
faiths, as well as those who are not religious believers at all.
This is a simple enough prescription. On a superficial level, it may
appear to raise Justice Alito's concern that it would demand greater
resources than many local communities have. On closer examina-
tion, however, I do not believe it does. To the contrary, such a stan-
dard relies on precisely the resource that local governments, which
stand in a closer, more intimate relation to their citizens, most pos-
sess: local knowledge. A genuinely small political community need
not look to surveys or census data to determine the backgrounds and
preferences of its people; whatever resources it lacks, it ought to have
this kind of knowledge in spades. A larger community, on the other
hand-recall that Greece's population was close to 100,000 people-
can be expected to have less local knowledge than that, but greater
resources. It has a larger number of representatives and a greater
number of employees. It is not beyond their capacity to call around;
to ask those local ministers that they do know for contacts in the
interfaith community; or for representatives to seek constituent in-
put. And even the knowledge that one lives in a bedroom commu-
nity with close to a hundred thousand residents, one that lies just
outside a larger city, is a form of local knowledge in itself. That fact
alone counsels doing more than relying on hand-me-down lists or
depending on the local jurisdictional boundaries. It suggests that the
presence of synagogues or other houses of worship just a few miles
away is a good reason to issue an invitation to those places. At a
minimum, it suggests that when a community is too large to rely on
local individual knowledge, some form of public notice or outreach
6]
294 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
may be required to achieve a properly diverse list of invitees. Greece
did not even do that.2 74
Contrary to Justice Alito's fears, the kinds of things that a com-
munity may do to ensure that the nature of its own religious pop-
ulation is reflected in its public practices are not necessarily costly,
demanding, or resource-intensive. They truly do simply require local
knowledge. What is not allowed is utter indifference to local condi-
tions, or-which is much the same thing-a reliance on political
boundaries that local residents know are not truly representative of
the demographics of the community. It should be relatively easy, and
certainly not impossible, for a community to meet such standards.
That the town of Greece did not should be treated as evidence that
it was, at the least, less than properly concerned to reflect the town's
religious diversity. In those circumstances, and for reasons having
less to do with the sectarian nature of the prayers that resulted than
from the fact that it was so careless about putting together a policy that
reflected the actual religious identity of the town, Greece's prayer
policy was rightly subject to a serious constitutional challenge.
As it is, one may conclude that Justice Alito's opinion, of all the
opinions in Galloway, most clearly addresses "the role of the local"
with respect to the constitutional permissibility of legislative prayer-
and that, for all the reasons he gives, the Court should have reached
the opposite conclusion in the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The outcome of Town of Greece v Galloway was unfortu-
nate, in my view, but not surprising. It is hardly a shock that a ma-
jority of the current Court is willing to affirm the constitutionality
of legislative prayer at different levels of government. Certainly
Marsh's fate was never in doubt-although it is striking that, where
it was once possible to muster three votes on the Court to hold that
legislative prayer is unconstitutional, now even the dissenters in Gal-
loway are unwilling to challenge that practice. If there is an impor-
tant doctrinal move in the opinion, it has less to do with this particu-
lar controversy than with what Justice Kennedy's opinion, with its
reliance on history and its statement embracing a wide range of prac-
"' See Galloway, 681 F3d at 23 (noting that the town acknowledged its failure to publicize
to town residents the existence of the opportunity to give invocations at board meetings).
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tices, such as the Pledge of Allegiance and inaugural prayer, as "part
of our expressive idiom," says about the chances of future challenges
to American civil religious practices.2 75 Many of those practices are
nowhere near as ancient as legislative prayer. Nevertheless, Galloway
suggests that none of them is going anywhere. That's not really much
of a surprise.
Viewed through a geographical lens, however, Galloway is more
interesting. A look at the religious geography of the United States-
at both a regional and a local level, both as a historical matter and
within contemporary American life-says more than mere doctrine
can about both American religious pluralism and our attempts to
deal with it at a political and legal level.
It conveys at least three lessons. It suggests that we might do
better to think not of one single American church-state settlement,
one definitive nationally applicable approach to questions of reli-
gious pluralism, but rather in terms of an array of American religious
pluralisms. It urges us to think more carefully about the role of local
jurisdictions in Establishment Clause law: to recognize the many sa-
lient social and geographical differences between towns, cities, states,
and other subunits of government, and not to rely too heavily on ju-
risdictional lines to resolve Establishment Clause cases, when the cir-
cumstances make clear that there is sometimes little correspondence
between jurisdictional lines and the lived reality of religious plural-
ism. Finally and more broadly, it suggests that law and religion schol-
arship should ease up on its obsession with Founding-era history or
abstract theory, stripped in both cases of geographical context, and
take more account of the role played by space and place in American
religious pluralism. If we continue to take the conventional approach,
we "risk missing something crucially important" about our subject.2 76
Law and religion, like American religious history and religious stud-
ies before it, could benefit from a spatial turn.
2 Galloway, 134 S Ct at 1825.
2 Gaustad and Barlow, New Historical Atlas of Religion in America at xxii (cited in note 1).
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